The pure possibility of Immanuel Kant's aesthetics by Ayas, Tuğba
THE PURE POSSIBILITY OF IMMANUEL KANT’ S AESTHETICS
A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
GRAPHIC DESIGN AND THE INSTITUTE OF FINE ARTS
OF BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF FINE ARTS
By
Tuğba Ayas
July, 2006
ii
I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in
scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Fine Arts.
                                                                                                                    .
Assist. Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman (Principle Advisor)
I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in
scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Fine Arts.
                                                                                                                    .
Assist. Prof. Dr. Elif Çırakman
I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in
scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Fine Arts.
                                                                                                                    .
Assist. Prof. Dr. Murat Karamüftüoğlu
Approved by the Institute of Fine Arts
                                                                                                                    .
Prof. Dr. Bülent Özgüç
Director of the Institute of Fine Arts
iii
ABSTRACT
THE PURE POSSIBILITY OF IMMANUEL KANT’ S AESTHETICS
Tuğba Ayas
M. F. A in Graphic Design
Principal Advisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman
July, 2006
This study aims at evaluating the aesthetic views of Immanuel Kant. The experience
of the beautiful and that of the sublime are discussed. The experience of the beautiful
is analysed with respect to the faculties of imagination and understanding and the
notion of free play. The experience of sublime is defined as the moment of facing the
transcendental I as the original condition of all possible human experience.
Key Words: Beautiful, Imagination, Understanding, Free Play,
Form, Sublime, Transcendental I.
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ÖZET
IMMANUEL KANT ESTETİĞİNİN SAF OLANAĞI
Tuğba Ayas
Grafik Tasarımı Yüksek Lisans Programı
Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Dr. Mahmut Mutman
Temmuz, 2006
Bu tez Immanuel Kant’ın estetik görüşlerini değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu
çalışmada güzel ve yücenin deneyimlenmesi araştırılmaktadır. Güzelin
deneyimlenmesi tasarım ve anlak fakülteleri ile bunlar arasında geçen özgür oyun
bağlamında incelenmekte, Yücenin deneyimlenimi ise tüm olası deneyin orjinal
koşulu olarak Aşkısal ben ile karşı karşıya kalma anı olarak tanımlanmaktadır.
                 Anahtar Kelimeler: Güzel, Tasarım Fakültesi, Anlak, ,özgür Oyun,
Biçim, Yüce, Aşkınsal Ben.
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ABBREVIATIONS
CPR: Critique of Pure Reason (The first critique).
CPrR: Critique of Practical Reason (The second critique)
CJ: Critique of Judgement (The third critique)
11. INTRODUCTION
This study aims to understand the position of the Critique of Judgement1 in
Immanuel Kant’s philosophy with respect to the experiences of the beautiful and the
sublime. What takes place in the experience of the beautiful? What are the functions
of the faculties of imagination and understanding in this experience? Do these CJ the
faculties transcend their functions that are given in the first critique, Critique of Pure
Reason2 when they are transferred to, or employed in the context of CJ? What are the
implications of the experience of sublime with respect to Kantian philosophy? Is
sublime actually an aesthetic experience? How does it have a subjective universal
character?
These questions prove to have complex answers within Kantian philosophy. It is very
important to state that this study is just an attempt of understanding Kantian
aesthetics. It starts with the fundamental issues of the whole Kantian philosophy,
since any attempt to deal with this philosophy necessarily deals with both the
metaphysical and the moral aspects of the whole Kantian system. However, this
study concerns the third critique and the first critique, since I try to relate the moment
of sublime to facing the transcendental I as the very condition of all subjectivity.
Thus, the moral subject and the sublime moment is ignored for I believe that the
moral destination of the subject which appears in the moment of sublime would be
the topic of another study. Therefore, I will not go into the details of the modality of
sublime which relates the subject to the moral feeling. Instead of this I will focus on
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 Here after CJ.
2the functions of the faculties; imagination, understanding and reason both in the
experience of the beautiful and that of sublime. Therefore, first I will give a brief
outline of the Kantian system and then will discuss Kantian aesthetics. I will
particularly focus on Kant’s views concerning the experience of the beautiful and the
sublime, especially the logical implications of both the experience of the beautiful
and the moment of the sublime.
I intend to examine the CJ by examining several notions of Kantian philosophy. In
the first chapter I will mention the notions of thing-in-itself, space and time, a priori
and lastly that of universality and necessity. This chapter is a guide to understand my
claims on aesthetics and consists of the key terms of Kant’ s first critique, CPR.
In the second chapter the general bearings of Kantian aesthetics will be introduced. I
will examine the experience of beautiful and the characteristics of the judgement of
taste which is a judgement about the object beautiful. I will focus on the notion of
free play in which the faculties of imagination and understanding is brought into an
accord. I will examine especially the position of imagination, the notion of the form
of the object of the experience of the beautiful and the notion of the accordance of
the faculties, imagination and understanding. Then, I will further my analysis into the
experience of sublime. I will give a brief summary of the account of the Kantian
sublime.
In the third chapter by a simple assumption that for a judgement of taste we need at
least a subject and an object of experience, I will write on the notion of the “I” and
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 Here after CPR.
3on that of object, then on the feeling of pleasure and displeasure which needs a
detailed analysis of the notion of finality and the final end. Then, I will examine the
concept of subjective universality with respect to three different occurrences in
Kant’s philosophy. The last part of the thesis will be the possible implications of the
sublime moment. I will try to justify that the moment of sublime, by the failure of
imagination’s giving the representation of the greatness it experiences, leads the
subject to feel desperate and overwhelmed but then also to feel empowered with the
awareness of his own power as the producer of his own knowledge or even of his
own world in the Kantian sense. I claim that the Kantian in sublime experience
subject faces the original condition of all his possible experience which is named
“transcendental self” in Kantian philosophy. Relying on this, I will claim that the
“experience” of sublime is both subjective (in the sense of being personal) and also
universal, since the subject faces the very possibility of all his experience. In other
words, I will claim that the moment of the sublime is the moment of the subject’s
facing his own power to cognize (in the sense of being the self to experience the
nature) or even to act free (in the sense of being a moral self) by facing the original
condition of all the possible experience, the transcendental self.
1. 1.  Copernican Revolution
Immanuel Kant, one of the important names of 18th century, claimed to have made a
Copernican revolution in philosophy. Before Copernic, people believed that the earth
did not move. Copernic suggested that the earth is also moving like other planets.
Kant contends that the older philosophy was like the pre-Copernican astronomy. It
regarded our minds as mere mirrors that passively reflect the things existing outside.
Kant claimed that the objects of our knowledge are not things as they are but they are
4manufactured products in the making of which our minds play a part. In other words,
human mind is just like a fabric that operates on the raw sense data that is given by
our senses and which is- according to Kant- a chaotic mass though pre-Kantians
regarded it as the “one”.
This claim implied a sharp distinction between knower and knowledge and led to a
dualism of subject and object3. Now for Kant what we know is just what appears to
us. In other words, human knowledge is limited to its capacity and the subject is
never able to know the things as they are, by Kantian terminology, the things-in-
themselves. We only know to the extent that our capacity lets us. This notion yields
to the distinction of noumenon and phenomenon. Noumenon is thing-in-itself, that is
what we are unable to know as it is and phenomenon is the appearance of the thing
as it appear to us, in other words how thing as it appears to us. By stating this Kant
made an important shift in the spirit of the philosophy in the sense that he is no more
concerned about ontology which is a branch of philosophy dealing with being, but
instead he directed philosophy to epistemology which means philosophy of
knowledge or theory of knowledge. Now we are confronted with a new philosophical
understanding, which takes the subject as the center by contending that it constructs
the knowledge. This was a breakpoint in philosophy because this fundamental idea
not only altered the way of philosophy but ended the traditional thinking; Kant
claimed to give up ontology by starting a critique in epistemology, which meant that
his philosophy is not concerned with whether things are but it is a search for giving
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 This dualism is felt in the works of late medieval philosophers and finally evolves in Descartes’ s
system in full. The philosopher separates body and mind so sharply that are defined as two distinct
substances they had to be reconciled only by God’s power. By Kant this dualism is brought to an end.
5the conditions of all possible experience4. He wrote: “ontology …must…give place
to the modest title of a mere Analytic of Pure Understanding” (CPR 267 A247). He
claims that this is possible, since we, as human beings, share the same structure of
mind.
Kant defines his philosophy as a transcendental philosophy. He warns us that it is not
transcendent but transcendental. The very reason of this contention is an attempt to
give the conditions of human experience. The concept transcendent is used to
indicate some entity or existence or condition that is beyond knowledge or which can
be grasped only by some power such as intellectual intuition. Kant was after an
inquiry of pure reason; thus such kind of investigation required the reason and its
powers. This was not an examination of a thing, which is beyond us but of the very
structure of mind. As a result, we have three great works investigating the conditions
of nature and its laws, the conditions of free will and that of judgement of taste or
aesthetics.
According to Kant all knowledge starts with experience but it does not arise from
experience (Prolegomena 41). Thus, there are two sources of human knowledge,
namely sensibility and understanding. These are the fundamental faculties of human
mind. As a subject, human mind operates on raw sense data given by sensation,
which is responsible of perceiving and supplying a manifold to the faculty of
understanding. This is the faculty of intuitions; sensory states and modifications.
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 Obviously, the underlying assumption was that we all share the same structure of mind.
6Then, we have a higher faculty which is the other source namely understanding the
faculty of concepts5. Kant writes:
Understanding is the origin of the universal order of nature,
in that it comprehends all appearances under its own laws and
thereby produces, in an a priori manner, experience (as to its
form), by means of which whatever is to be known only by
experience is necessarily subjected to its laws (Ibid. 69).
 This faculty of understanding is where the manifold that is received by sensation is
subsumed under some pure concepts, which are called categories. They are tools of
understanding in synthesizing6 the manifold given by sensation into a meaningful
whole such as a concept of an object. There are twelve categories, which govern the
raw material coming from the sensibility. For instance, in the principle that “a
straight line is the shortest distance between two points” presupposed that “line” falls
under a concept of magnitude, which has its place only in understanding and it serves
to “determine the intuition (of the line) with regard to their quantity, that is, plurality.
Kant writes about categories that they are “mere logical functions, can represent a
thing in general but not give by themselves alone a determinate concept of anything”
(ibid. 80).  Here we see that understanding’s principles and concepts have their
confirmation in experience. But every experience is unique and the sense of
wholeness cannot be a single intuition received by sensation but it is rather beyond
the possible experience. At this point we are introduced to the highest faculty;
Reason. It is responsible for higher topics of human mind and it has its own ideas
like the idea of God, the idea of world and any of this kind which expands the
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 This notion of two faculties indicates- for philosophy at least- that Kant is somewhere between
empiricists and idealists. Since experience is the beginning of the process of knowledge but not the
only source.
6
 By synthesis Kant means the “act of putting different representations together, or grasping what is
manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge” (CPR 111 B103).
7sensible knowledge. They aim at completeness of principles and they are the
collective unity of all possible experience and so they are transcendent (Prologemena
76). They do not have their object in any given experience.
Kant clearly states that his critical philosophy is a transcendental philosophy which is
“the system of all principles of pure reason” (ibid. 60). Philosophically, his position
is quite separate from mainstream flow of thought. In other words, Kant is not after
validating or proving the existence of things. Ontology is abandoned to
epistemology. Kant does not ask about the natural philosophy but is concerned with
the understanding.  His inquiry is somehow internal in the sense that he takes nature
as the object of all possible experience. This leads to the notion that the objective
validity is nothing else than necessary universality. In other words, the conditions of
our experience are at the same time the universal and necessary laws of nature that
can be known a priori. This is the solution of the question “how is the pure science
of nature is possible?”  For Kant is not concerned about “what is” but “how it is
possible”, one is not supposed to know “how the external thing is” but he is to know
“how its experience is possible” or “what are the necessary conditions that make it
possible?” All in all, according to Kant we must not seek the universal laws of nature
in nature by means of experience, but conversely must seek nature as to its universal
conformity to law, in the conditions of the possibility of experience, which lies in our
sensibility and in our understanding (Prolegomena 66). It is because for Kant nature
is the “existent of things”, “not a thing-in-itself but something synthetically
constructed” (ibid. 44). Similarly, Kant attempted to verify that the basic principles
of modern science correspond to the fundamental principles of our conceptual
scheme, which is responsible for determining any possibility of experience. In other
8words, he featured the physical world as being made necessary by the a priori
principles of our understanding.
The second critique, Critique of Practical Reason7, deals with the laws of freedom,
in other words ethical behavior of man. Kant holds that the deterministic laws of
physics can be brought into harmony with the unconditional commands of morality.
He contends that “the practical concept of freedom is based on the transcendental
idea of freedom” (CPR 465 A533/B561). “The denial of transcendental freedom
must... involve the elimination of all practical freedom” (CPR 465 A534/B562). This
means that the human subject acts freely and his moral actions are not determined by
a cause or the agent’s events that he initiates are not subjected to a chain of cause.
Even when we have the principle that “every event must have a cause” there is the
independence of will or power of self-determination. What Kant means is that our
actions are subjected to the causal chain or they are affected by sensuous impulses
since our action, which is the result of our will, is empirical and determined.
However, from the transcendental viewpoint of agent it is a free action.
1. 2. The Notion of the Thing-in itself
 For Kant any attempt of traditional metaphysics trying to understand the thing-in-
itself is useless, since without the structure of understanding, nothing is meaningful
to a subject. Now if we are to enter the world of noumena with understanding, then
we have phenomena8 or appearances. If we go without the aim of understanding,
than nothing is meaningful. Thus, any kind of inquiry should be done within the
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 Here after CPrR.
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 Phenomena are called the appearances that are thought as the objects with respect to the unity of the
categories (CPR 265 A249).
9awareness of the limit of the knowing subject. In other words, any application of the
concepts of the understanding beyond its field is ridiculous. One cannot use the
concepts of understanding in order to understand or know the world of the thing-in-
itself because understanding works with predicates when it deals with the thing-in-
itself and it is a failure to think the predicate as the thing itself.
The claim that the thing-in-itself causes phenomenon is not equivalent to the claim
that noumenon causes phenomenon in time. This kind of causal relation cannot be
spatial or temporal, since causality can be noticed merely among the appearances.
Thus, the phrase “non-effective in time” is meaningless. This can be put in another
way: There is no possibility of non-existence of the thing-in-itself or for it not to be.
The notion “possibility” of experience is in human mind. The possibility does not
belong to the world of the thing-in-itself (Prologemena 52).
The ‘thing’ at issue with the thing-in-itself” is a concept
without an object, a mere shell of an object without content,
without reality, indeed without as such being genuinely
possible (CPR 12).
By the expression “without reality”, one should understand that Kant is not after
giving an ontological postulation of thing-in-itself. It is neither possible -since being
possible involves being contingent- nor real since reality implies existence or in
Kantian words “reality is that determination which can be thought only through an
affirmative judgement” (CPR 264 A246).
The concept of a noumenon is necessary to prevent sensible
intuition from being extended to things-in-themselves, and
10
thus to limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge
(CPR 271 A253).
Kant seems to use the concept of noumenon as a convenience. This concept implies
the active power of the faculty of understanding or it emphasizes the distinction
between the knower and its object. Kant also writes:
The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept,
the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility;
and it is therefore only of negative employment (CPR 272
B311).
In my opinion, thing-in-itself does not have to be a “border”, because the concept of
border reminds the notion of “beyond”, thus when Hegel reads the concept of thing-
in-itself as the one side of the border, he meant two realms separated by a border.
However, Kant does not postulate two worlds or realms. He obviously does not
presuppose a world that is unreachable by subject. This kind of contention supposes
an existence beyond both subject and thing-in-itself. This kind of view requires an
intelligible intuition; something like God’s vision. Kant writes:
If by ‘noumenon’ we mean a thing so far as it is not an object
of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of
intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the
term. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensible
intuition, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition,
namely, the intellectual, which is not that we possess, and of
which we cannot comprehend even the possibility. This
would be ‘noumenon’ in the positive sense of the term (CPR
268 B307).
At this point what Kant states is that the concept of noumenon does not represent
anything or it does not affirm any positive thing beyond the subject or its faculties.
The noumenon is just a title, since it indicates the impossibility of applying
11
categories to something beyond the field of sensibility. We cannot have any synthetic
a priori principle outside the field of experience.
If we intuited things as they were this would mean that understanding would be
nothing more than “principles which enable us to expose the appearance”. Categories
would be useless, then we would be supposed to reflect the things as they are.
However, Kant writes that the sensibility is limited by understanding so it does not
concern with things-in-themselves but only with how they appear (CPR 251).
Although he writes “noumena …the title of an unknown something” he insists that
he does not attribute any positive existence to noumenon.
Kant was aware that sensible intuition might not be the only possible intuition but he
stated that at least it is so for us. Thus, he never neglected the possibility of any kind
of intuition that can know the things-in-themselves. He seemed to have accepted an
agnostic position in this sense, so admitted that the possibility of a noumenon’s being
“ not a mere form of the concept” is still an open question.
In my opinion Kant is not after speculating a relation between thing-in-itself and
appearance because he does not start with the external world or noumena. He tries to
give the conditions of all possible experience. Thus, the world of things-in-
themselves is not postulated either ontologically or epistemologically. This idea
evolves from the basic assumption that every appearance should be an appearance of
something that does appear. In other words, if appearances are representations then
there must be a represented. In this sense the absence of the represented is not the
12
issue, since such would be an ontological kind of claim with which Kant is not
concerned.
According to Kant the thought of noumena arises from the understanding’s operation
by the given in sensibility. This is because of the fact that understanding limits the
sensibility in such a way that sensibility does not deal with things-in-themselves but
only with the mode of their appearance. Moreover, the concept of appearance
corresponds to something since it does not subsist on its own, or since it cannot be
anything outside of our mode of representation. Thus, we see that appearance
indicates a relation to something “immediate than sensible and the object would thus
be a noumenon in the positive sense” (CPR 269 B308).
The existence of geometry and maths quite clearly refutes the contention that we
merely reflect things. At least up to this point Kant is right to claim the existence of
some faculties for human mind. This contention of faculties whatever quality they
have leads us to the claim that if we as thinking beings do not reflect the external
world, then we may not be able to know things as they are. This is the Kantian view
that claims that because our faculty of understanding limits the sensibility to the
appearances, we do not know things-in-themselves. It is obvious that this restriction
is necessary if we consider the aprioristic account of the notion of time and space in
Kantian philosophy.
In my opinion, what causes the distinction of noumena and phenomena is the notion
of space and time by their being a priori and subjective (meaning their residing in
subject). Therefore, the criticism of Kantian philosophy over the postulation of an
13
unknown entity such as the thing-in-itself is invalid, since the separation of the two is
immediately caused by placing space and time in the subject as forms of sensibility
or in other words filters of experience. They govern all possible experience;
therefore, the a priori intuitions; space and time frame subject’s intuition. This notion
culminates in the distinction of things as they are and their appearances as the only
objects of experience. The domain of noumena is empty for us. Kant writes:
…[w]e have an understanding which problematically extends
further, but we have no intuition, indeed not even the concept
of a possible intuition, through which objects outside the field
of sensibility can be given, and through which the
understanding can be employed assertorically beyond that
field  (CPR 272 A255).
1. 3. The Notion of A priori
With respect to the conditions of human experience Kant uses the term a priori. His
philosophy deals with the a priori conditions of human knowledge. This term is used
as an adjective of many terms such as concept, intuition, proposition or judgement9
in Kant’s works. A priori is used to indicate that something is not derived from
experience, in other words, not empirical, but it is applied to experience. In Kantian
philosophy empirical has its source in experience or in Kantian words in a posteriori.
However, a priori is absolutely free from the experience.
 As to the a priori knowledge, Kant writes that it is entitled as “pure” when it does
not carry anything empirical. Pure a priori concepts do not entail anything empirical
but they serve as the conditions of possible experience. This, actually, enables them
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 According to Kant judgement is a union of representations in one consciousness.
14
to have objective reality. The pure concepts of understanding are categories by which
alone we can think of any object. They are the forms of our thought and a priori
conditions of an empirical object (CPR 129 A96). They are the elements of
understanding and raw sense data is subsumed under them so as to be meaningful.
They are grouped into four titles: quantity, quality, relation and modality.
Kant also defines them as logical functions which unite a priori the manifold given
in intuition (CPR 266 B306). This presupposes that each representation is not
absolutely different to others. In other words, knowledge arises by the comparison
and connection of various representations. Thus, it is defined as a whole on the
ground of which there is a synthesis. This synthesis of a threefold nature consists of
apprehension of representations as alterations of our mind in intuition, reproduction
of them in imagination and recognition of them in a concept (CPR 129 A97-8). In
the end of this process the manifold given in intuition is synthesized and united in
one consciousness, then we have a concept of an object.
As for propositions, a priori means that propositions which are a priori have
application on sensation or better on the material given by sensation. Similarly, for
the a priori concepts, “cause” may be a good example. “Every event must have a
cause” is an a priori principle of Kantian philosophy. Kant states that “whenever an
event is observed, it is always referred to some antecedent, which it follows
according to a universal rule” (ibid. 44). Here it is important to notice that the term is
epistemological, which means that it can be applied to knowledge of facts, but not to
facts. The term a priori is used for judgements also. Charlie Broad makes this point
more clear:
15
…(T)he ordinary use of a priori as applied to judgements is
this. One of p is a priori if and only if one can see that p is
necessary. One may come to recognize that p is necessary
either directly through inspecting its terms and reflecting on
them or indirectly by showing that p follows in accordance
with the principles of formal logic, from other propositions
each which one can see by direct inspection to be necessary
(3).
 We also know that if a judgement is not derived from experience and if it has no
exception as alternative, then this judgement is a priori and has strict universality
(Prologemena 44). From this point necessity and universality are assigned by Kant as
the certain criteria for a priori knowledge.
As to a priori judgements, we see synthetic and analytic judgements, the notion of
which Kant makes distinct. A famous instance of analytical judgement is “All
bachelors are unmarried.” To be unmarried is a characteristic and necessity for being
a bachelor meaning that the concept of bachelor contains to be unmarried. It would
be contradictory to think a married bachelor. All these suggest that analytical
judgements in the form of “all A’s are B’s “ are necessarily a priori. They are
explicative; they add nothing to the content of knowledge and depend upon the law
of contradiction. Since in analytic judgements merely the concept of subject is
analysed, they are a priori even the concepts are empirical.
Synthetic judgements are expansive. In other words, they increase the given
knowledge. Judgements of experience and that of mathematics are two kinds of
synthetic judgements. Kant gives an instance from arithmetic: According to Kant the
addition 7+5=12 is synthetic a priori because the concept of twelve does not
necessarily follow from the addition of 7+5. Thus, we have both a priori and an
16
expansive judgement in this addition. It expands our knowledge but it is not
depended apply to experience. This notion of synthetic a priori is accepted as a
threshold in philosophy. It entailed the kind of judgement that constructed the main
problematic of Kantian philosophy. Mathematical judgements are the best example
of synthetic a priori judgements in the sense that they are not derived from
experience but they are certainly applicable to experience.
1. 4.  Space and Time
The aprioristic account of space and time by which Kant rejected the relativist
account of Leibniz and the absolutist account of Newton has a great importance in
his system. In Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason the
philosopher gives the metaphysical and transcendental expositions of space and time.
They are mentioned as,
1. Forms of appearances
2. Forms of sensibility and,
3. Pure intuitions
To begin with, space and time are forms of appearances since whatever is given to us
is given under these conditions. As being the conditions of the possibility of
appearances, space and time are presupposed, in experience. Anything given to us is
given in spatial and temporal order. Thus, space and time are necessarily imposed on
appearances by human mind.
17
Secondly, they are the forms of sensibility whose matter is sensation. Thus, space
and time govern what appears. As being forms of sensibility, they have subjective
reality and they have their ground in the subject. They make all the relations
especially particular relations possible.
Lastly, space and time are pure intuitions since they cannot be derived from relations
of things. They are not a priori concepts because such concepts are general and
involve a plurality of empirical instances e.g. the concepts of the motion or the
alteration whereas space and time do not carry any empirical knowledge about the
objects but they are a priori intuitions and are themselves the content of pure
intuition and can only be known by a priori intuition. As being pure intuitions they
help us to construct mathematics, geometry that takes space as basis and arithmetic
which needs time to construct its judgements.
In the metaphysical exposition of space Kant writes:
Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived
from outer experience. For in order that certain sensations be
referred to something…in another region of space from that
in which I find myself… the representation of space must be
presupposed…(It must also be presupposed) in order that I
may be able to represent (certain sensations) as being not
only different but as indifferent places. Therefore, the
representation of space cannot be empirically obtained from
the relations of outer appearances. On the contrary, this outer
experience is itself possible at all only through the
representation (CPR 68 B38/A23).
For the transcendental exposition of space Kant writes that it does not represent any
property of things-in-themselves, nor does it represent them in their relation to one
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another. Moreover, space is a necessary a priori form of intuition, which underlies
all outer intuitions. It is the form of all appearances of outer sense
(CPR 71 A26/ B42).
As for the feature of space Kant states that it is not a “compositium but a totum”,
which means that its parts can be conceived through the whole. Different spaces
cannot be successive but only simultaneous, since there is one space.
Space is given by Kant as the basis of geometry whose propositions are synthetic a
priori10 and has apodictic certainty. Both geometry, whose propositions are synthetic
a priori, and sensibility takes space as basis; so according to Kant, their propositions
should coincide with the external object of our world of sense.
As for time and its metaphysical exposition Kant writes that it is not derived from
experience, so is not an empirical concept. According to Kant, since time is
presupposed as underlined in our perception, both coexistence and succession is
possible. Only due to the presupposition of time a lot of things are represented as
“existing at one and the same time (simultaneously) or at different times
(successively)” (CPR 74 B46/A31). Thus, time has three main aspects that are
duration, succession and simultaneity (co-existence). These three temporal concepts
have their application in physical world in the sense that duration applies to
substance, succession to causation and simultaneity to reciprocal interaction.
                                                          
10
  The proposition “ Two straight lines cannot enclose a space and with them alone no figure is
possible” is synthetic a priori because this proposition can be derived neither from the concept of two
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Moreover, it has only one dimension; different times are not simultaneous but
successive. It is “not discursive, but a pure form of sensible intuition” and the
“original representation, time must… be given as unlimited” (CPR 75 B47/A32).
As for the question of why we represent things in a temporal order but not in several
sequences, Kant’s answer would be that we conceive of all events as involving
objects and those objects last through the change. Therefore, a single object may be
involved in many events, and this is the reason we conceive of these events as all
belonging to a single sequence: the history of that object.
About the empirical reality and transcendental ideality of these two concepts, Kant
asserts that space and time have their objective validity with respect to appearances,
which we take as objects of our senses. As a result, they are empirically real, if we
consider the world of appearances, as being the conditions of space and time have
absolute reality, that is they do not belong to the things absolutely, since the
properties of things-in-themselves can never be given to us through senses. This is
transcendental ideality of space and time. If we think of those abstracted from the
subjective conditions of sensible intuition, they are nothing but ideal (CPR 80 B56/
B58). Moreover, they are the sources of a priori synthetic knowledge. When they are
together, they are the pure forms of all sensible intuition and make synthetic a priori
propositions possible.
                                                                                                                                                                    
straight lines nor from that of two, so requires an a priori intuition. Otherwise, it is not possible to
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1. 5. The Transcendental Philosophy
The term transcendental refers one of the major notions of philosophy. When Kant
claimed to have a transcendental philosophy he meant:
[t]he idea of a science for which the critique of pure reason
has to lay down the complete architectonic plan. That is to
say, it has no guarantee, as following from principles, the
completeness and certainty of the structure in all its parts. It
is the system of all principles of pure reason (CPR 60 B27).
Kant continues the paragraph by claiming that CPR cannot be called transcendental
philosophy by itself. Whole of the a priori knowledge is needed. The completeness
of all human knowledge is possible by giving the functions of a priori concepts and
exhibiting them as the “principles of synthesis” and by examining the concepts of
morality which has no place in transcendental philosophy because the concepts of
morality “ must necessarily be brought into the concept of duty…(CPR A15 B29).
Kant concludes that transcendental philosophy is a philosophy of pure and
speculative kind of reason. Practical realm consists of empirical events. Thus,
although morality’s primary concepts and highest principles are a priori, it does not
concern transcendental philosophy.
Therefore, a transcendental kind of philosophy deals with the principles and concepts
a priori of the human knowledge. It traces back the pure concepts to their first
occurrence and their taking place in the understanding. They are distinguished from
all sensibility.
                                                                                                                                                                    
produce universally valid propositions.
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Kant also claims that transcendental philosophy proceeds according to a single
principle. As to this principle, pure concepts are placed in the understanding and
constitute a systematic whole.
A privilege is given to the transcendental philosophy as its concepts are necessarily
related to objects a priori and the “objective validity of which cannot therefore be
demonstrated a posteriori” (CPR 179 B175). This fact supplies transcendental
philosophy an advantage over sciences such as mathematics.
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2. KANTIAN AESTHETICS
2. 1. General Bearings of Critique of Judgement
The term Aesthetics is known to be used first by Baumgarten. Thus Kant began his
inquiry first by differentiating his position from Baumgarten. He saw aesthetics as a
kind of truth that is different from the one that is taught by sciences. Aesthetics was a
truth because it belongs to the world we live, to the ‘life-world’ in as Bowie's words
(a term borrowed from Husserl) According to Bowie:
Baumgarten sees empirical perception in the ‘life-world’ as
an inherent part of the truth of our relationship to the world,
hence his insistence upon including aesthetics as a
constitutive part of philosophy. The problem of the meaning
of this world does not arise, because our aesthetic pleasure in
it suffices to fill played by metaphysics, even when the
principle of the aesthetic, the particular, points to problems to
come. What happens -for Baumgarten this is evidently
unthinkable- if there is no centre from which to organise the
endless multiplicity, if this particular pleasurable moment has
no connection with any other? (Bowie 5).
Unlike Baumgarten, Kant is known to handle aesthetics as a separate realm than
metaphysics. He treats aesthetics independently from theoretical and practical
(ethical) realms. However, the position of aesthetics is such that it stands –at least
Kant wants it to stand- as a bridge between the two realms, namely understanding
and reason. In the faculty of aesthetic realm, judgement makes the transition
possible. Heinz Heimsoeth writes that Kant is the first to make a systematic aesthetic
of idealism and he does not present it by bringing the question of beauty in nature or
in works of art but instead he investigates the feeling of pleasure and displeasure in
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the experience of the beautiful and he examines the structure of this experience
(Heimsoeth 166).
Treating aesthetics as belonging to an independent realm, Kant started a very critical
debate which is developed in the ‘project of modernity’ (Bowie 8). It was the
principle of subjectivity Kant had to face in the third critique (Critique of Judgement)
when he was examining the mechanism of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure.
His notion that we all share the same structure of mind brought inevitably the
question of multiplicity of taste in the third critique. The subject of the first critique
(Critique of Pure Reason) was responsible from the construction of the object of
human knowledge, a priori conditions of which were given in the universal structure
of human mind.
     With respect to the difficulty of theorizing subjectivity it is a well-known fact that in
philosophy, before the ‘project of modernity’, there are many ways suggested, as
Bowie argues, which focused on the reason’s grounding itself in subjectivity.
According to him subjectivity is treated as an issue of philosophy for a long time.
Subjectivity is thought to be the truth that can be found in self-consciousness of the
single ego. Subjectification of being resulted in “an aesthetics based on subjectivity”
which “has no way of articulating the truth in works of art that goes beyond their
reception at a particular time” (9). According to Habermas (cited from Bowie), by
the end of ‘project of modernity’ subjectivity led to the intersubjective
communication in post-modernity. Kant, however, argued the intersubjective validity
of the aesthetic pleasure relying on the idea that aesthetic pleasure arises from the
free play of the cognitive faculties (Bowie 9).
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In the second critique (CPrR) Kant opened a space for free will and thus moral
actions of his subject by contending that as a rational being man uses his own reason
as legislator and applies it to his own moral principle. This means that moral law is
not given to him but it comes from the very structure of the human mind. Thus,
subject of moral realm is autonomous. In other words, the moral obligations come
from inside rather than outside or nature. If moral actions are empirical however, this
does not mean that the moral actions are not exposed to the causal chain.
Indeed, this is a very important point because the notion of our moral decisions being
free from this causal chain, yet arising from the so mentioned universal structure of
our minds, needs serious explanation. Kant asserts that we and thus all kinds of our
actions are subjected to the principle of cause. However, our moral decisions are free
or autonomous before they are performed. They are subjected to the laws of nature as
to their conclusions or actions. Hence, the existence of the subject opens to the
autonomous world of ethics as free from the sensible world. This is the inevitable
truth of being subjects or thinking beings.
The principle of subjectivity emerges again in the third critique and this time the
concept of the multiplicity of taste dependent of subjectivity becomes a crucial point
to be clarified in Kantian system because Kant seems insufficient to explain or, better
to say, to expose subjectivity. The difficulty lies in that we each experience the same
object whose sensation is exposed to the same process of the faculty of sensibility,
however, one may find it beautiful while others may not. The very notion of
universal structure becomes a problem here again in explaining the variety of taste.
The feeling of pleasure and displeasure which is central to the notion of beauty
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seems not to be subjected to the laws of nature but instead as being the result of a
free play of the two faculties, namely imagination and understanding11,
2. 1. 1.  The Position of the Critique of Judgement
When we come to the third critique, the Critique of Judgement, we see that Kant
attempts to reconcile the laws of freedom and that of the nature. Thus, CJ operates as
a bridge between the first and the second critiques. In CJ what Kant tries to do is to
combine all the interests of human mind under a notion he calls “reflective
judgement”. By this notion he is after a kind of experience or data that will show that
“nature; theoretical reason and intelligible world; practical reason coincide”
(Heimsoeth 153). We are reminded here of Kant’s assumption about human
cognition: it is composed only of three broad realms-understanding, judgement and
reason; and the three faculties that correspond to them, the thinking faculty, faculty
of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire.
According to Kant, beautiful and sublime belong to a new realm called the
“Aesthetik”. The pleasure of evaluating a work of art is no doubt is in practical
reason. Now in this new world we have feelings that cause just trouble when thought
of in practical realm. We are confronted with the judgement of taste or the feeling of
pleasure and displeasure. Judgement of taste is synthetic, according to Kant, since it
surpasses the concept as well as the intuition of the object. It is added to that intuition
as a predicate. It is also a priori, for it concerns the agreement of everyone. Thus,
Kant claims that if the judgement of taste is synthetic a priori, then the CJ has the
                                                          
11
 This notion of co-operation of reason and understanding indicates an attempt of reconciling the
autonom and heteronom understanding not as fused but as co-existed.
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same problem of transcendental philosophy that asks the possibility of synthetic a
priori judgements (CJ 288-9).
Therefore the third critique tries to define beauty and analyze the aesthetic
judgement. It analyses aesthetic judgement because it is not a judgement of
understanding, but a judgement which is out of the scope of both theoretical and
practical reason and which is a judgement about  “beautiful”, since for Kant beautiful
and sublime carry a formal principle that activates the harmony in us. Aesthetic
judgement, thus, is in the realm of aesthetics and not a determinant but a reflective
judgement. It is not determinant because of its undefinable nature in the sense that it
is being subjective and contingent. This nature makes us think only in the form of
reflective judgement.
Kant has his right to claim a subjective universality of aesthetic judgements. This is
because of two important reasons. First of all, even in CPR he opens a space for
freedom, which will appear in CPrR and will construct the fundamentals of morality
by stating that the human mind have some Ideas which would deceive him unless
examined carefully, and also by stating that human mind has a tendency to grasp the
world in totality. Now when we turn to CJ we see that it is positioned somewhere
between the two critiques. The universality of the aesthetic claim comes from the
relation to CPR whereas the subjectivity of it comes from CPrR. However, as we will
examine the idea of subjective universality we will notice that it is not unproblematic
as viewed by Kant.
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2. 2. Characteristics of Judgement of Taste
In the third critique we meet with a new faculty: Judgement. Just as the
understanding’s concepts and reason’s ideas, judgement has its own principle;
finality.
Thus, according to Kant, the finality of nature is called a “subjective principle”, since
it is “neither a concept of nature nor a concept of freedom” when thought in
transcendental sense (CJ 184). This principle is responsible for the accordance of the
“representation of the object in Reflection” with the conditions universally valid. He
writes that:
When the form of the object (as opposed to the matter of its
representation, as sensation) is, in the mere act of reflecting
upon it, without regard to any concept to be obtained from it,
estimated as the ground of a pleasure in the representation of
such an Object, then this pleasure is also judged to be
combined necessarily with the representation of it, and so not
merely for the Subject apprehending this form, but for all in
general who pass judgement. The object is then called
beautiful; and the faculty of judging by means of such a
pleasure (and also with universal validity) is called taste (CJ
190).
Moreover, Kant claims the subjective universality of the feeling of pleasure and
displeasure.
… [o]ne who feels pleasure in simple reflection on the form
of an object, without having any concept in mind, rightly lays
claim to the agreement of every one, although this judgement
is empirical and a singular judgement. For the ground of this
pleasure is found in the universal, though subjective,
condition of reflexive judgements, namely the final harmony
of an object (be it a product of nature or of art) with the
mutual relation of the faculties of cognition, (imagination and
understanding,) which are requisite for every empirical
cognition. (CJ 191).
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The above mentioned mutual and compulsory relation (in the sense of cognizing any
object) turns out to have a possibility of not developing when we come to the
experience of the beautiful. In the realm of knowledge, we had no chance of not
having one of the two sides, so we feel that the experience of beautiful does not
belong to the realm of cognition. Thus, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure does
not arise from sensation or representation of the object but from the representation of
the object in reflection which accords with the universally valid a priori conditions
or the faculties of the subject. However, this accordance is not necessary but
contingent. The notion of contingency seems to explain the reason why an object is
found beautiful by some while not by others.12 However, the unity of imagination
and understanding does not seem to be contingent in the sense that at least
understanding is regulated according to some a priori principles which means
whether imagination exposes a random behavior, we know that understanding carries
a definite representation of the object which is supplied by the synthesis of the
manifold or the multiple experiences of the object.
In CPR Kant writes that imagination is one of the three subjective sources of the
knowledge of things13. It represents appearances in association (and reproduction). It
has productive and reproductive synthesis. The former is a priori whereas the latter
rests on empirical grounds. The former, “the principle of the necessary unity of pure
(productive) synthesis of imagination” is both prior to apperception and is the ground
of the possibility of all knowledge (CPR 143 A118). Kant continues by writing that
                                                          
12
 However, the same object’s being found beautiful at once but not at another time by the same
subject does not seem to have a proper explanation.
13
 The other two are sense and apperception. Imagination connects the given by sense with the inner
sense.
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imagination gains a transcendental character when it is directed to the a priori
association of the manifold.
The manifold of purely spatial elements and that of purely temporal elements which
are given by sensation, are synthesized in an intuition which is ascribed to a faculty
called imagination. Synthesis is “the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind
but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge
whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious” (CPR 112 A78).
Now imagination is probably the faculty which rides freely among the
representations supplied by understanding. Moreover, during this ride it produces
some new representations based on the ready made representations of the
understanding. When a representation produced by the power of imagination accords
with that which is given by understanding, the feeling of pleasure arises, then the
object is claimed to be beautiful.
At this point I think the event of free play, that is Kant’s contention of its taking
place between the two faculties, is a result of some unknown and untheorizable
functions of the two faculties. It is because Kant gives the whole structure of the
faculty of understanding as determinant. As for  that of imagination, he writes:
Imagination...is able...to recall the signs for concepts, but also
to reproduce the image and the shape of an object out of
countless number of others of a different, or even of the very
same kind (CJ 234).
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Relying on these, I think, the notion of free play, in the sense of being free,
correspond merely to the faculty of imagination, since it has its ability to play with
the representations given by understanding. The judgement of understanding is
determinant thus necessary and definite whereas imagination finds itself in reflection.
As a result, the notion of accordance is not the accordance of the two faculties, but
that of their representations. What is contingent is this relation of accordance which
is simply an estimate prior to any concept. When this estimate is proved in the
concept then we have the feeling of pleasure.
2. 2. 1. The Analysis of the Beautiful
According to Kant, beauty is not a perceived feature of objects in the world, taste
colour and shape are. So experiencing something as beautiful does not consist in
perceiving a quality of the object. Rather it is a matter of your deriving a
disinterested pleasure from the perceived form of the object- the form considered in
abstraction from the nature of the object that manifests it, from the kind of object you
are perceiving or the concept under which you perceive it (and so from what the
function of the object is or what the object is intended to be).
First of all, it follows from a disinterested pleasure taken from the perceived form of
the object. By disinterested what Kant means is that when we call something
beautiful, we are not interested in its function, its nature which makes the object that
object or concept under which we perceive the object. Our calling something
beautiful is not a judgement of knowledge but that of taste. In other words, according
to Kant beauty is not a perceived feature of objects in the world, as colour and shape
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are, so our experiencing something as beautiful does not consist in our perceiving a
quality of the object.
The second principle of aesthetic judgement is that the feeling of pleasure which
determines the judgement of taste is free from any purpose. Kant uses “final without
an end” or “purposive without purpose”. They mean that the feeling of pleasure is a
kind of pleasure that we feel without any purpose or without thinking anything about
the object that we call beautiful.
Kant warns us that aesthetic pleasure is different from good, because good is
something that we feel pleasure by the concept and understanding. It is related to a
concept. In other words, when we call something good, we know that thing or we
have a concept about that thing. However, we feel pleasure out of formless lines
those are drawn randomly. Thus, beautiful is the object of a feeling of pleasure which
we do not hope any use or do not follow any purpose.
The third and the fourth features are universality and necessity of aesthetic
judgements. Why do we insist that what we call beautiful should be seen as beautiful
by others? According to Kant,
The beautiful is what pleases in the mere estimate formed of
it (consequently not by intervention of any feeling of sense in
accordance with a concept of understanding). From this it
follows at once that it must please apart from all interest (CJ
91).
Thus, when we feel pleasure before a beautiful thing this cause of feeling of pleasure
results from the free play of imagination and understanding. The judgement about the
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beautiful is a judgement of taste but not a judgement of reason, in other words we
have no chance of misunderstanding, thus this purposeless feeling should be
universal and necessary for everyone.
2. 3. Sublime
The notion of sublime is another fundamental issue of the Critique of Judgement
Kant defines sublime as absolutely great.  The experience of sublime is also defined
as pleasing just like that of the beautiful. However, the beautiful and the sublime are
quite different in many ways.
Firstly, the beautiful has the delight which is of quality, whereas the sublime has that
of which is coupled with quantity. Secondly, the beautiful is a “presentation of an
indeterminate concept of understanding” while the sublime as that of an
“indeterminate concept of reason” (CJ 91).
Therefore, just as the aesthetic judgement in its estimate of
the beautiful refers the imagination in its free play to the
understanding, to bring out its agreement with the concepts
of the latter in general (apart from their determination): so in
its estimate of a thing as sublime it refers that faculty to
reason to bring out its subjective accord with ideas of reason
(indeterminately indicated), i.e. to induce a temper of mind
conformable to that which the influence of definite (practical)
ideas would produce upon feeling, and in common accord
with it (CJ 256).
Another important distinction which follows from the relations of the cognitive
faculties, the imagination and the understanding is that the beautiful evokes a
positive pleasure as the result of the accordance of these faculties whereas the
sublime causes a negative pleasure as the result of the conflict of the faculties in
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question. The latter is defined as an emotion “ dead earnest in the affairs of the
imagination” (CJ 245).
The beautiful represents a joyful and charming imagination while the sublime, an
unpleasant shock. According to Kant aesthetic judgement upon sublime depends
merely on the subjective play of mental powers (imagination and reason) as
harmonious by virtue of their contrast. Thus, in the experience of the beautiful,
imagination and understanding generate subjective finality of mental faculties, but in
that of sublime, imagination and reason do so by their conflict.
Kant also writes that unlike the beautiful which results from an immediate, pre-
conceptual relation to the form of the object, the sublime does not correspond to any
sensuous form. Kant writes that the sublime is the "disposition of the soul evoked by
a particular representation engaging the attention of the reflective judgement, and not
the object" (CJ 97). It is a concern of the ideas of reason. Although they cannot be
represented properly, the sublime “may be excited and called into the mind by that
very inadequacy itself which does admit of sensuous presentation” (CJ 245).
Sublime has double mode as mathematical and dynamical. Pillow writes that this
division is caused by the dual power of reason. Because reason has cognitive and
practical aspects, imagination’s inability causes two distinct judgements of sublimity
(71). The former is evoked when in comparison anything else is small. In other
words, in the case of mathematical sublime everything in nature is infinitely small
when compared to the greatness experienced. We know that Kantian philosophy
claims that reason is after absolute totality. In such kind of sublime experience we
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have also imagination which is compelled to process into ad infinitum. However, the
inability of imagination to attain an estimation of the magnitude of the thing in order
to accomplish this idea of totality that reason looks for, a feeling of supersensible
faculty is evoked in us. Then we have mathematical sublime as “the mere capacity of
Critique of Judgement thinking which evidences a faculty of mind transcending
every standard of sense” (CJ 250).
Mathematical sublime involves an estimation of magnitude by numbers and a mere
intuition. Numbers are the mathematical side and the mere intuition mentioned is
aesthetic. In this sense the magnitude of the measure is mathematical but its
estimation is aesthetic since "all estimation of magnitude of objects of nature is in the
last resort aesthetic" (CJ 251). Thus, the reflection of mathematical sublime conveys
the idea of sublime, not in the mathematical estimation of magnitudes, since in the
former magnitude presented absolutely but in the aesthetic estimation since it is a
relative kind of magnitude which is compared with a similar kind. It consists of two
operations of the faculty of imagination: apprehension (apprehensio) and
comprehension (comprehensio aesthetica) (CJ251). Kant writes that the former can
process into ad infinitum:
[b]ut with the advance of apprehension comprehension
becomes more difficult at every step and soon attains its
maximum, and this is the aesthetically greatest fundamental
measure for the estimation of magnitude. For if the
apprehension has reached a point beyond which the
representations of sensuous intuition in the case of the parts
first apprehended begin to disappear form the imagination as
this advances to the apprehension of yet others, as much,
then, is lost at one end as is gained at the other, and for
comprehension we get a maximum which the imagination
cannot exceed (CJ 252).
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Kant writes that we should not expect to find sublime in works of art but in things of
nature or in rude nature because a pure judgement upon sublime does not involve an
end which belongs to the object as its determining ground, then it is aesthetic and
cannot be grasped neither by judgements of understanding nor by those of reason (CJ
253).
As we see mathematical sublime is evoked by a piece of nature which cannot be
measured properly or in other words by which imagination fails to represent in a
totality. It is inadequate to measure and represent the greatness in the experience
since it is compelled to process infinity. The capacity of imagination is challenged by
the piece of nature.  For Kant when a magnitude compel our imagination to its limit,
then for an aesthetic comprehension of that magnitude, a feeling of being restricted
arises. Such a comprehension feels all aesthetic comprehension small (inadequate)
that the object is grasped as sublime with such a feeling of pleasure (through) by
means of a displeasure (CJ 108).
As for dynamical sublime Kant introduces a term “might” which is defined as a
power superior to great hindrances and he continues that if in an aesthetic judgement
nature is represented as a might which does not possess dominion over us, then we
are confronted with dynamical sublime (CJ 260). The estimation of nature as
dynamical sublime is a source of fear.
Bold, overhanging, and, as it were, threatening rocks,
thunder-clouds piled up the vault of heaven, borne along wit
flashes and peals, volcanoes in all their violence of
destruction, hurricanes leaving desolation in their track, the
boundless ocean rising with rebellious force, the high
waterfall of some of trifling moment in comparison with their
might (CJ 261).
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In dynamical sublime the subject resists to the nature but then realizes that it is
useless to resist it. Then the might of it becomes attractive for the subject though it is
at the same time fearful. Kant claims that, the objects called sublime trigger a power
of resistance which supplies us with courage to compare ourselves by the
omnipotence of nature.
It is also important to note that Kant defines the sublime as:
[A]n object (of nature) the representation of which
determines the mind to regard the elevation of nature beyond
our reach as equivalent to a presentation of ideas (CJ 119).
This equation of the sublime with the ideas means that it is in no way in the object
but in the idea of a supersensible faculty whose existence is revealed by the inability
of imagination in aesthetic estimate of the object which evokes the feeling of the
sublime. Kant writes about the occurrence of this supersensible faculty:
But precisely because there is a striving in our imagination
towards progress ad infinitum, while reason demands
absolute totality, as a real idea, that same inability on the part
of or faculty for the estimation of the magnitude of things of
the world of sense to attain to this idea, is the awakening of a
feeling of a supersensible faculty within us; and it is the use
to which judgement naturally puts particular objects on
behalf of this latter feeling, and not the object of sense, that is
absolutely great, and every other contrasted employment is
small (CJ 97).
With respect to the modality of sublime, Kant writes that “without the development
of moral ideas, that which, thanks to preparatory culture, we call sublime merely
strikes the untutored man as terrifying" (CJ 265). In this sense according to Kant
what we call sublime is a power of mind which enables it to overcome hindrances of
sensibility by means of moral principles (CJ 124).
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Coleman writes that the finality of sublime lies in “our awareness of belonging to the
realm of moral ends, or as being of intrinsic worth” (106). This moral feeling is
defined as a native capacity by Kant. Thus, moral ideas assure the universality of
sublime in the sense that Kant refers to a hypothetical man who remains unaffected
of sublime:
[w]e say of man who remains unaffected in the presence of
what we consider sublime, that he has no feeling” (CJ 265).
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3. THE POSSIBILITY OF KANTIAN BEAUTY
3. 1. On the Notion of the “I”
Any attempt to investigate aesthetic taste needs a notion of the subject. In Kantian
understanding of aesthetics there seems to be problems about the account of feeling
of pleasure and displeasure which is regarded as the basis of experiencing beautiful
and sublime. The question is how Kantian system can give the explanation of the
individual taste. Since according to Kant, the universal and necessary conditions of
all our experience are at the same time the laws of nature, we have no other chance
than experiencing the same things as phenomena. Therefore, one expects people to
find the same thing as beautiful. Obviously, Kant is aware of this fact and gives his
account around the notion of subjective universality. In my opinion this notion
should be traced back to the first critique (CPR); to the notion of the self as well as
the idea of freedom which is one of the ideas of Reason14. A detailed analysis of
these two concepts may lead to a better understanding of Kant’s aesthetic view or
may conclude in a complete refutation of it.
To begin with, the idea of self in Kant is highly complicated. The philosopher writes
about self and self-consciousness in CPR; in Transcendental  Deduction B:
Just as for knowledge of an object distinct from me I require,
beside the thought of an object in general [viz. The category
of thinghood], an intuition by which I can determine that
general concept, so for knowledge of myself I require beside
the thought of myself an intuition of the manifold in me, by
                                                          
14Reason is the highest faculty of human mind as to thought and it has some concepts that are called
Ideas responsible of some thoughts such as the first cause or the completion of all the experience.
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which I determine this thought... I exist as an intelligence
which is conscious solely of its power of combining. But, in
respect of the manifold which it has to combine, I am
subjected to a limiting condition...viz. that this combination
can be made intuitable to me only according to relations of
time... Such an intelligence therefore can know itself only as
it appears to itself in respect of an intuition... which cannot be
supplied by the understanding itself (169 B158-9).
According to the passage I have no single intuition corresponding to the idea of
“me”, so the understanding is not able to give me the thought of “me”. It is because
this kind of thought of oneself needs the many intuitions that are received in different
times. In other words, a manifold of intuitions related to me is required to have an
idea of “me”15
According to Kant by a faculty called inner sense or empirical apperception we are
provided raw data or a manifold of one’s states. Various registers of one’s individual
activities are supplied by this faculty but these stay as such until transcendental
apperception synthesizes16 them. Then we have the knowledge of one’s own states.
This division of apperception into two is needed in order to indicate, on the one hand,
the existence of one’s states as changing by the time and being different from each
other, in other words “consciousness of self according to the determinations of our
state in inner perception”, and on the other hand, the “original unchangeable
consciousness” which is called transcendental apperception. This kind of
apperception is given as responsible from even the unity of  space and time as the a
priori conditions of  all our experience. Kant writes:
                                                          
15
 Obviously, this notion of intuitions of oneself in different periods indicates the function of memory
that is rarely mentioned in Kantian philosophy.
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The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of
the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally
necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according
to concepts... (Transcendental Deduction B, §14³ 136-7
A108).
This point deserves more attention when we review the whole Kantian philosophy in
the sense that up to this point we had space and time as the governors of our
experience but now we see that they have their own transcendental condition which
is transcendental apperception. This claim leads us to the following conclusions:
(1) The idea of self is obtained by a synthesis of the variety of a subject’s various
actions. According to this claim, the actions related to the subject’s own states
occurring respectively the time t¹, t² and t³ belong to the empirical self. This means
that in the mentioned times we have three different states of one’s own which are
successively received and then kept in memory. In each of these experiences we have
only a subject but as to the awareness of their belonging to the same subject, and this
means the action of uniting apperception transcendentally is something done by
transcendental apperception, and this kind of self is the transcendental self of one’s
own. Now what is done by transcendental self to the manifold of our states related to
our selves is similar to the construction of the concept of an object. Since Kant
claims that the concept of an object is constructed when the manifold of the
representations belonging to that object are gathered or synthesized, or in other
words the concept of object is the “formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of
the manifold of representations” (Transcendental Deduction B, §14³ 135 A105). The
idea of self is thus constructed by transcendental self in the same way a concept of
                                                                                                                                                                    
16
 By synthesis Kant means “act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is
manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge.
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object is. Indeed, each of our representations of the object is accompanied
necessarily by an “I”. Now, is this “I” both an  empirical self in the sense that I can
also, in inner sense, have the awareness of an “I” experiencing that object at the time
t and also the transcendental self  in the sense that, as quoted above, it enables space
and time to be the conditions of all our experience? Actually we could tend to think
that transcendental self is just like the ideas of reason and it seeks a completion of
several representations of empirical self, but Kant does not mention about
transcendental self as belonging to the faculty of Reason.
(2) Transcendental self is, again, the transcendental condition of a priori intuitions,
namely space and time. Since space and time are the very conditions of all our
experience in the sense that without them things would not appear as such,
transcendental self is an ultimate transcendental condition of a priori conditions of
experience.
(3) Keeping the above remark in mind we should try to think on the very basis of
subjective universality which is a crucial point in Critique of Judgement. This
principle is given as the ground of one’s own taste being both personal and universal.
Now, since transcendental self seems to be given as the ultimate transcendental
condition of all possible experience it is also pre-assumed in reflexive judgement
which is the judgement of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure.
 This indicates actually both the impossibility and the possibility of Kantian
aesthetics in the sense that there can be no room for individual taste, if, as the
ultimate ground, we all have a transcendental self  and if Kant thinks this self as a
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unity, we would be determined by a higher kind of self in us. On the other hand, if
Kant thinks that this self is a kind of pure principle which supplies to one more than
being the transcendental condition and the synthesis of one’s empirical selves in a
consciousness, then this would give us a hope of giving an account of personal tastes
in the sense that it would be responsible for the free play that takes place between the
faculties of imagination and understanding and which culminates in an aesthetic
judgement. Since, transcendental self unites all empirical selves in one
consciousness, it would be possible for a Kantian to claim that, because of the variety
of experiences of a person, the united selves may be unique by contending that we
are all experiencing different times and places and so on. Thus, what is united
possibly differs from other united selves. Then we would have a subjective ground
for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Or from another aspect we can read this
as follows: Transcendental apperception’s being the ground of space and time and
enabling them to operate can mean that even in the Critique of Pure Reason we have
the ultimate subjective condition. Indeed one may contend that it is quite normal to
have a subjective ground since in Kantian philosophy the subject constructs the
knowledge, but it should be reminded that Kant in CPR tries to determine the
universal and necessary conditions of all human experience at least. However, the
notion of transcendental apperception contends that it is the very ground of all even
the a priori intuitions, space and time. But again we should notice that all I claim are
reflections since Kant does not give a detailed account of transcendental self and its
relation to aesthetic pleasure. In the CPR he only deals with the universal and
necessary conditions of human cognition which according to him does not involve
any aspect related to aesthetics.
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3. 2. The Notion of Object
The faculty of understanding with its principles and concepts a priori  operate in an
empirical and in a transcendental manner. A transcendental employment of a concept
indicates its application to things in general whereas its empirical employment of it
is its application solely to appearances. Kant claims that this latter use requires a
logical form of the concept and also an object that would supply the content of the
concept. A concept without an object corresponding to it would be just an empty
logical function. Thus, in order for understanding to operate in an empirical sense we
need empirical objects, or appearances as objects of experience (CPR A239). Thus,
we confront two senses of the concept of the object in Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason:
1) as appearances
2) as transcendental object= X.
The former occurrence of the object indicates that appearances are the only objects of
our experience, since we do not know things as they are. Objects in this sense are
immediately given and each corresponds to representations. Kant writes:
 
When a judgement agrees with an object, all judgements
concerning the same object must likewise agree among
themselves. And when we have a judgement having
universal validity, it refers also to a characteristic of object
(Prolegemena 46).
This means that the judgement of perception which requires only the logical
connection of perception in a thinking subject and the judgement of experience that
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requires pure concepts in order to provide the objective validity by agreeing among
themselves. Thus, the connection of the representations of object is determined by
this relation and the judgement upon the object is objective.
A subject’s primary characteristic is its being a thinking being. Thus, the notion of a
thinking being directly relates to the notion of object. Subject is not something which
merely perceives. This fundamental claim leads to the construction of object.
Kant reminds us that since our representations are made to be referred to some object
by understanding, we have a transcendental object X which serve for the unity of
manifold in sensible intuition. This unity enables understanding to combine the
manifold into the concept of an object (CPR A250). It is important to note that this
transcendental object in question is not independent of sensibility because in that
case we would not be able to think it. However, we see that Kant claims
transcendental object, not being empirical, has thus not been intuited. Moreover, it
cannot change and is always one. It is “what can alone confer upon all our empirical
concepts in general relation to an object, that is objective reality” (CPR A109).
Therefore, by saying that it is not independent of sensibility Kant does not mean that
it entails a certain intuition. It is the concept of an object which represents the
appearances in general. It does not correspond to a single appearance but is thought
through the manifold of the appearances (CPR A251). This notion of transcendental
object is determined by the categories of understanding and it is the object to which
appearance in general is related by subject, thus, it is the “completely indeterminate
thought of something in general (CPR A253).
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The notion of object is a requisite for us in order to analyze the notion of the free
play of the faculties; understanding and imagination, since it is a reflection on the
form of the object. We see that in CPR the object occurs as appearances or objects of
experience and as the transcendental object standing for the representation of not a
single appearance but of appearances in general.
3. 3. The Notion of Finality
In Kantian philosophy the faculty of reason and its concept of freedom is accepted to
have an influence on nature. The action, a result of the subject’s free will and
determination, occurs as a phenomenon, since in the end it appears as a sensible,
empirical event. However, the realm of nature and the faculty of understanding does
not have an effect on free will. Kant clearly states that any reciprocal relation
between the two realms is rejected.17 Since, Kant claims that reason is absolutely free
from any determination of understanding, he places judgement as a bridge which
enables the transition from understanding to reason. This new faculty suggests a
spontaneous and free play which bodies a link between the mentioned two realms.
By faculty of judgement Kant is able to claim that our desire is connected with the
concept of nature only in an intelligible way which means our moral actions are not
determined but are still related to the nature. Besides the fact that our actions which
are the results of our desire are in the end subjected to the laws of nature when they
occur as phenomena, our faculty of reason has some harmony of a spontaneous and
contingent kind that takes place in our faculty of judgement.
                                                          
17
 Kant’s rejection of any kind of reciprocal relation comes from the idea that nature may effect
subject’s free will, in other words, nature may determine one’s desire. This may culminate in
determination of subject’s freedom, which in the end means that one has no free will.
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Finality as being the concept of judgement plays a crucial role in this contingent
harmony. It falls under the natural concepts when it is considered as theoretical
finality and regulates the cognition of an object’s various representations given by
sensation whereas it becomes a constitutive principle when we are only interested in
the form of the object and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure arising from this
(merely form based) kind of experience of an object. Thus, we see that this twofold
character of finality enables judgement to link the two faculties not by a theorizable
but a spontaneous and contingent kind of mediation.
Kant makes a distinction between principles and by claiming that there are two types
of principles namely transcendental and metaphysical. According to him, under the
transcendental principle we represent the universal condition of all possible
experience such as “every event must have a cause” whereas metaphysical principle
is defined as somehow referring to an external cause, thus it contains the principle
“every event must have an external cause”.
This distinction gains importance when we come to the principle of formal finality of
nature which occurs in the third critique. This principle is of a transcendental kind
and it is defined as the knowledge of nature which is determined by Kant  “by a
manifold of particular laws” (CJ 182). In each of our cognition we tend to think some
empirical laws for the sake of understanding but we know that these individual laws
are the manifold and they are contingent. Kant calls this cognition of the unity of
laws as finality of nature.
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In order to get a closely connected whole out of experience we need the
transcendental concept of finality of nature. This concept supplies us with the
convenience in reflection and supports a systematic unity among the empirical laws
that arouse from our various experiences. Kant indicates that this unity is not of a
kind whose existence is possible. In other words, since the finality of nature makes
reflection operate effectively, it is subjective and contingent, thus it does not have an
existence of a provable kind.
In order to operate effectively understanding has to set a meaningful or linked
experience of given perceptions, thus we have to evaluate endless possible states
with multiple empirical laws. The multiplicity of empirical laws result from the very
structure of understanding in the sense that for each possible experience (let’s say the
experiences in time t¹, t², and t³), we apply the pure categories of understanding
where we confront with causality or “every event must have a cause” as a
transcendental principle or the concept of substance in order to make meaningful
pieces of our experience. Thus, this means that we have at least three possible
empirical laws, or three nexus corresponding to our experiences that took place in t¹,
t², and t³. This means we possess a manifold of empirical laws resulted from the
operation of understanding by subsuming what is given by sensation under some
pure concepts. In this sense, finality of nature represents this manifold of contingent
empirical laws. Moreover, it is a priori and has its place in understanding. In this
sense it indicates a tendency of subject’s co-existence of many independent sets of
experiences.
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At this point Kant also writes about the law of specification of nature which is an a
priori principle for the possibility of nature. It is a subjective principle attributed to
subject and prescribes a law to itself which he calls heautonomy just for the sake of
reflection that divides nature’s products into species and supplies an explanation, so
an interpretation. Thus, this principle of law of specification makes judgement to
reflect a natural order which is not cognized a priori in nature but makes nature
cognized by understanding in a meaningful order.
Back to the principle of finality, it is of reflective judgement and only by this
principle we may investigate empirical laws which are contingent in their nature and
which are different from the nature’s universal laws. Thus, one may claim this
principle makes the variety of empirical laws possible and supplies a unity or better a
whole of them, so understanding is able to grasp the knowledge to operate on. This
principle is the ground of variety of empirical laws which supply particular states and
finally fall under some universal laws of nature but also of those which, on their own,
do not have an objective reality in the way that universal laws of nature have. The
latter according to Kant arises from spontaneity and any kind of origin is
presupposed as their origin. It is understandable that in order to grasp any kind of
empirical nexus we have to form a temporary (system of) whole. Thus, what the
principle of finality of nature gives us is a system of empirical laws.
Now let us look at the connection of the notion of finality with the feeling of pleasure
in order to understand the roots of the theory of beautiful. In order to do this the
feeling of pleasure needs to be traced back to the nature. Since, for Kant an aesthetic
judgement has its universality besides its subjective character, he gives an account of
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universal subjectivity of the aesthetic judgement. However, it is not a point that I will
focus on now. The point of this argument is to indicate the relation of the idea the of
beautiful to nature but it is important to remind that Kant does not contend that
beauty is a quality of external object. Here what I want to examine is the position of
the feeling of pleasure in nature. For Kant constructs his third critique as the bridge
between the two realms; the nature and the realm of freedom.
Kant claims that every aim which is accomplished causes a feeling of pleasure.
Therefore, the feeling of pleasure has its a priori ground and it becomes valid for all
men. However, Kant notes that this kind of pleasure should not be confused by the
pleasure of the faculty of desire. In other words, with the practical world. Moreover,
one may ask whether we have the feeling of pleasure when our perceptions are
subsumed under the universal concepts of nature (the categories) to which Kant’s
answer would be negative in the sense that subsuming the manifold given by
sensation under the pure concepts (again the categories) is the ultimate and necessary
aim of understanding which means that it is not counted as an aim but as the natural
attitude of understanding. This means that the raw material’s (given by sensation)
falling under the categories cannot be separated from understanding as its aim. In this
case the feeling of pleasure is so fused by simple cognition, according to Kant, that it
no longer attracts attention. However, when it comes to the accordance of empirical
laws of nature with the universal laws of nature, a feeling of pleasure is admitted to
emerge just because it means that the manifold of various empirical laws are assessed
and some are in accordance with the universal laws of nature. Conversely, the
cognizance of the possibility of uniting the particular empirical laws with universal
empirical laws would be a displeasing feeling for the subject. Since this would mean
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that a subjective specification of particular laws would not enable the particular
empirical laws in question to go beyond subjectivity or to gain verification in the
name of universality.
Kant goes further by contending that the pleasure or displeasure is connected with
the subjective side of representation of any object. Here space is given as the
subjective condition of the sense perception of external things. One should remember
that space as the form of outer intuitions has both subjective and objective character
since besides having its ground in the subject it enables phenomena to appear as
such. It is important to note that because it is the a priori form of all our experience,
space is not an element of sensation of external things but still it has its place in the
employment of cognizing the external objects.
By stating that although both space and sensation are counted as subjective sides of
perception of external things, they are both necessary conditions of all possible
human cognition, Kant opens a place for pleasure or displeasure as being the
subjective side of a representation. He claims that they can never become an
“element of cognition” (CJ 189).
As for the finality of a thing Kant writes that finality is prior to any cognition related
to object and thus it has a subjective quality. Here the claim gets more complicated
since Kant writes:
Hence we only apply the term ‘final’ to the object on account of
its pleasure: and this representation itself is an aesthetic
representation of the finality-The only question is whether such
a representation of finality exists at all.(CJ 189)
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From the quotation above, it is inferred that any representation of an object with
which a feeling of pleasure arises immediately is prior to a cognition of the object
and this kind of representation does not take part among those which would be united
and would thus give us the concept of the object. Therefore, the finality of an
aesthetic kind belongs to the subjective representation of the object. In the paragraph
which follows the quotation above, Kant continues his word by stating that the
pleasure, which arises before any cognition of the object, results from the
“conformity of the object to the cognitive faculties brought into play in the reflective
judgement” (189). This is expressed as the subjective formal finality of the object.18
The ground of pleasure lies in the form of the object which is the object of reflection
in general, or in other words, the pleasure does not arise from any sensation of the
object. The representation of the object in this general reflection accords with the
faculties of subject but this accordance is of a contingent kind. Kant further states
that:
 ....it gives rise to a representation of finality on the part of the
object in respect of the cognitive faculties of the subject (CJ
190).
Kant in the eighth part of the Critique of Judgement continues by stating that we
confront two types of finality in an object. The finality of the form of the object can
represent the harmony of the form of the object in apprehension or it may represent a
harmony between the form of  the object and a concept which includes the ground of
this form. The former kind results in the feeling of pleasure whereas the latter refers
                                                          
18
 The concept formal indicates the formal character of the experience, meaning that this subjective
kind of formal finality of the object is related to an immediate relation only to the form of the object.
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to a determinate cognition of the object under a given concept. Thus, in the latter
kind of finality understanding operates and an intuition corresponding to the concept
is checked out.
Now relying on this, Kant makes the distinction between teleological and aesthetic
judgements. The first one is the “faculty of estimating the real finality” and the
second is the “faculty of estimating formal finality”. For the former, we need some
particular experiences and they should be united under the concept containing a form
which corresponds to the form of the object. In this kind of finality we work with
concepts and we deal with a harmony with the concepts, whereas in aesthetic
judgement feeling is the criteria. By Kant’s words, aesthetic judgement is a “special
faculty of estimating according to a rule, but not according to concepts” (CJ 194).
The notion of the “principle of nature’s formal finality for our cognitive faculties in
its particular (empirical) laws -a principle without which understanding could not
feel itself at home in nature” (CJ 193) is understandable when metaphysical aspect
(of Kantian philosophy) is concerned but Kant writes:
 ...the transcendental principle by which finality of nature,
in its subjective reference to our cognitive faculties, is
represented in the form of a thing as a principle of its
estimation...(194)
When the content of transcendental is concerned for the Kantian philosophy, it is
important to note that Kant writes the above mentioned transcendental principle
                                                                                                                                                                    
This is just the apprehension of the form.
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leaves a space for aesthetic judgement to decide by feeling about the harmony of the
form of the object with our subjective faculty.
With respect to the relation of the three broad realms, understanding, judgement and
reason Kant writes that:
Understanding, by the possibility of its supplying a priori laws
for nature, furnishes a proof of the fact that nature is cognized
by us only as phenomenon, and in so doing points to its having
a supersensible substrate; but this substrate it leaves is quite
undetermined. Judgement by the a priori principle of
estimation of nature according to its possible particular laws
provides this supersensible substrate (within as well as without
us) with determinability through the intellectual faculty. But
reason gives determination to the same a priori by its practical
law (CJ 196).
3. 3. 1.  Finality in General
Kant defines ‘an end’ as “the object of a concept so far as this concept is regarded as
the cause of the object” (CJ 220). In other words, when we cannot think of an object
itself or its cognition without a concept of it, then we see an end there. And Kant also
defines finality as “the causality of a concept in respect of its Object. Thus, we have
the concept as the source (cause) of the representation of the object (effect). This
indicates the faculty of desire which operates merely through concepts. At this point
Kant warns us that we can have a concept and its effect, i.e. the object as an end. In
other words, we may have a representation of the object. However, we may also have
another concept which is without an end, meaning that which rests on reflection and
does not have a conformity to its object necessarily in cognition but in reflection.
This is called finality i.e. finality can exist without an end. This existence of finality
is called by Kant as the only foundation of the judgement of taste. In this kind of
finality we see a very subjective character and according to Kant it is free from any
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subjective or objective end. It is a mere form of finality, free from any concept. Thus,
a concept is not presupposed as in the end. This finality which is related the form of
the object enables the subject to get a delight from the object it confronts.
The objective finality of an object is the one "by means of which a reference of the
manifold brought to a definite end, and hence only through a concept" (CJ 227).
Thus, we see that the finality in which a concept is presupposed and actualized in the
experience of the object is the objective finality. Kant writes that this kind of finality
i.e. objective finality is not something external and internal according to the object. It
means that it is not external to the object, so being not related to its utility it is not
internal to the object, either. So it is not about the perfection of the object (CJ 227).
However, still Kant warns us that in order to get closer to the objective finality we
call a concept of an end and here such finality is an internal kind.
About the formal finality Coleman writes that:
Kant links the pleasure of aesthetic judgement to the great
underlying theme of the Critique of Judgement: the
purposiveness of the Nature. Aesthetic judgement ‘alone
contains a principle introduced by judgement completely a
priori as the basis of its reflection upon nature. This is the
principle of nature’s formal finality for our cognitive
faculties in its particular (empirical) laws-a principle
without which understanding could not feel at home in
nature.’19 The pleasure of aesthetic judgement arises from
estimating or reflecting upon the forms of objects, either of
Nature or of art (7).
Another reflection on finality can be raised by relying on the formal (subjective)
finality. I would like to present it as follows:
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1. Applying to the very principal of Kantian philosophy, our object is in no doubt a
phenomenon.
2. A phenomenon is at least passed from the a priori intuitions, space and time, since
they govern all our experience.
3. Formal finality, as the result of a mere reflection on the form of the object,
indicates that no concept is attributed to this thinking activity.
4. This leads to the claim that the judgement of taste which is given by the help of
feeling of pleasure and displeasure is contingent in the sense that it is related just
one of the representations, which are a manifold and named by formal finality, of
the object in reflection. In other words the judgement of taste is just one of the
subjective and multiple representations with respect to the nature of the object.
5. Thus, can we claim that this feeling of pleasure and displeasure is celebration of
the thing-in-itself’s entering our world, the world of phenomena? At this step we
deal merely with the form of the object, we feel that it is strictly claimed to be
subjective. Because neither imagination nor understanding is at work yet at this
stage.
6. This brings us to the conclusion that we -at least at level of a priori intuitions-
have a reference -of subjective kind- to the cognitive faculties. Kant does not
refuse but on the contrary admits that kind of subjective reference but he does not
give the details of this reference which is necessarily needed.
Back to the point of theorizing this kind of claim, one may assert that he avoids this
exposition against the difficulty in question. However, his attempt of writing the
Critique of Judgement needs an application of a priori forms of all possible
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 Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, introduction. Ak.V: 193; Meredith, p.35
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experience, namely space and time at least when he writes on the form of the object.
Since he tries to give the subjective and universal conditions of judgement of taste.
3. 4. Subjective Universality
In Kantian philosophy we can differentiate four different meanings of being a
subject. The first and second meanings appear in the first critique CPR as the
transcendental subject and empirical subject. The third is the moral subject appearing
in the second critique CPrR. The last one is the universal subjectivity of the third
critique CJ. As to the subjectivity we know that it has two meanings in Kantian
philosophy. The first one implies that since we can only know the things appearing to
us, our world has its own objectivity arising from the conditions which stand both as
universal and necessary. Because of the very fundamental contention that we know
only the things as they appear to us, the objectivity is also grounded on subjectivity.
Thus, the subjective20 conditions of experience are at the same time the universal and
necessary conditions of all possible human experience.
With respect to the ordinary meaning of the term subjective as meaning personal, it
occurs in Critique of Judgement as the adjective of the judgement of taste and refers
to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. However, the judgement of taste is also
announced to have a universal character; therefore, it is claimed to have a subjective
universal communicability which is the mental state present in the free play of
imagination and understanding and which exists apart from the presupposition of any
concept (CJ 217). Kant continues by saying that this relation which is subjective and
                                                          
20
 Kant mentions the issue of subjectivity while he deals with the ideas of faculty of reason. Ideas of
reason, since they are not dependent on experience, cannot be confirmed by experience; thus, the
investigation of pure reason has to stay as subjective (Prologemena 42).
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appropriate for a general cognition must be valid for everyone and thus universal (CJ
218). He writes:
[f]ree play of the cognitive faculties attending a
representation by which an object is given must admit of
universal communication: because cognition, as a definition
of the Object with which given representations (in any
Subject whatever) are to accord, is the one and only
representation which is valid for everyone (CJ 217).
Thus, estimation of the objects or the representation of them is prior to the pleasure
and it is the basis of this pleasure. Then, the “universality of the subjective conditions
of estimating objects forms the sole foundation of this universal subjective validity of
the delight which we connect with the representation of the object that we call
beautiful” (CJ 218).
It is important to note that Kant also gives two kinds of finality one of which is the
“turn on subjective” and “rests on the pleasure immediately felt in mere reflection on
the form of the object”  (CJ 192). The other is an objective kind which has a concept
“antecedently”. This enables Kant to argue for the subjective universality of the
feeling of pleasure and displeasure in the sense that an immediate relation to the form
of the object without using any concept represents the possibility of diverse tastes.
To sum up, the universality of the judgement of taste comes from the very conditions
of all human experience in the sense that the faculties which are the sides of the free
play are brought into accord in reflective judgement but although this free play does
not deal with any concept (i.e. relates to the very conditions of experience), the
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judgement of taste carries a universality. Moreover, this purely subjective estimation
of aesthetic judgement sustains its subjective character relying on the experience of
the beautiful.
Kant writes that for every empirical cognition “the mutual relation of the faculty of
cognition (imagination and understanding)” is required (CJ 192). Now this mutual
and compulsory relation (in the sense of cognizing any object) turns out to have a
possibility of not evolving when we come to the experience of beautiful. In the realm
of knowledge, we had no chance of not having one of the two sides, so one’s more
we see that experience of beautiful does not belong to the realm of cognition. Thus,
the feeling of pleasure and displeasure does not arise from the sensation or
representation of the object, but from the representation of the object in reflection
which accords with the universally valid a priori conditions or the faculties of the
subject. However, this accordance is not necessary but contingent. This notion of
contingency seems to explain the reason why an object is found beautiful by some
while not by others (However, the same object’s being found beautiful at once but
not at another time by the subject does not seem to have a proper explanation).
As for the subjective universal character of the sublime we see that it does not
depend on common sense. The universality of sublime comes from a noble feeling
than the common sense. Since the sublime is related to the morality closely, its
universality comes from the subject’s being a moral being and Kant claims that the
man who claims not to feel the sublime is actually has no feelings. My suggestion the
transcendental I as the very condition of all the subjectivity which is faced in the
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moment of sublime seems to have its universal ground apodictically, since without
this condition nothing would be possible in the case of a subject.
3. 5. On the Experience of the Beautiful                                                        
In this section I want to examine the experience of the beautiful in detail so as to
indicate the problems of the Kantian notion of beauty. Then I will focus on the
sublime by using the conclusions drawn from the above-mentioned analysis. Kant is
so hard to follow that I want to proceed by the help of many quoted sections in order
to keep a systematic form in my exposition. My selection will be from the
introduction of the Critique of Judgement since it has an overview and will enable
me some convenience.
Since there are many concepts and notions in the Critique of Judgement for us to
examine, it is better to begin with the fundamental notion of the critique: aesthetic
judgement. A judgement of this kind is on the finality of the object21 which is not
dependent on any concept and which does not produce one of itself. As to the finality
of the object, Kant writes that the term “final” is used for the object when its
representation is immediately goes along with a feeling of pleasure. This feeling of
pleasure arises from the accordance of the faculty of the imagination, the faculty of
intuitions a priori, with understanding (faculty of concepts) by means of a given
representation. This accordance is not of an intentional kind and it is realized by the
reflective judgement which is essential for imagination to actualize its fundamental
function, that is apprehension22 of forms (CJ 190). We should remember that
                                                          
21
 All this section belongs to the 30th and 31st pages of Introduction of CJ. The reference is not given
since I rearrange it for the sake of my aim.
22
 Apprehension is imagination’s immediate direction upon perceptions (CPR A120).
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reflective judgements (which are the judgements of the faculty of Judgement) are
opposed to determinant judgements which are precise and factual like laws of nature.
Now when the form of an object (in the sense of sensation opposed to the matter of
the representation of the object) is reflected upon, without aiming at obtaining any
concept from it, it constitutes the ground of the pleasure in the representation of the
object. The pleasure in question is necessarily regarded as belonging to the
representation of the object, thus the pleasure is not only for the subject in reflection
but it is for all. This object is called ‘beautiful’ and the faculty which judges by
means of the pleasure and with universal validity is called ‘taste’. The ground of
pleasure is with the conformity to law in the empirical employment of judgement in
general which is the unity of imagination. By this conformity to the law the
representation of the Object in reflection accords with the universally valid a priori
conditions. This accordance is contingent and leads to a “representation of finality on
the part of the object in respect of the cognitive faculty of the Subject” (CJ 190).
At this point I suggest that we need to examine the key terms in detail. Let me begin
with the “form” of an object. What is the form of an object, as sensation, opposing to
the matter of the representation of an object? If we suppose that the representation of
an object carries form and matter, the former is given as sensation by Kant and the
latter is left to be the concept of the object.
When we are talking about the form of the representation of the object, do we mean
at the same time the form of an object? (Since we are concerned merely with the
appearance of the object but not the thing-in-itself) The answer is probably positive.
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Now if we think any representation of an object consisting of form and matter, then
we have form. But this form by itself cannot lead us to the knowledge of the object.
In fact what it entails is most probably the raw material filtered by space and time as
a priori intuitions: appearance. Our acceptance of this notion makes the point of
“reflecting upon the form of the representation of the object regardless of any
concept” clear in the sense that when we are performing the action above we do not
relate anything that would lead us to the knowledge of the object which belongs to
the faculty of cognition. However, Kant writes that the reflective judgement, in
which imagination is brought into accord with understanding, compares the forms
that are apprehended by imagination and in this act the accord takes place. Now we
know that as sensation, the form of the object, according to the Critique of Pure
Reason, involves the manifold of appearances. However, if they are combined with
consciousness we should call them perceptions. Now we know that the faculty of
judgement accepts merely reflective judgement as its employee. Moreover, the
reflective judgement is also fundamental for imagination in apprehension and since
imagination is called apprehension when it is immediately directed upon perceptions,
then we can infer that by sensation and so by the form Kant meant appearances
combined in a consciousness and that are immediately directed upon.
To sum up, the form of the object is an important detail in discussing the Kantian
aesthetics. It emphasizes that the experience of the beautiful necessarily belongs to
the sensation since it has nothing to do with any concept of the understanding. Thus,
it has an empirical character. The conclusion we derive from this section is that the
form of an object would mean what is passed from a priori intuitions, space and time
as the conditions of all our experience.
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With respect to the free play we should remember again the imagination’ s capability
given by Kant in order to play free. Until the third critique this faculty seems to
reproduce appearances and produce a priori intuitions. However, these functions are
not defined as independent of the understanding. Even in CJ Kant claims the
imagination depends on the understanding and cannot be without it. Now its better
for us to trace back the imagination to CPR.
At the beginning of all experience we are given appearances. When they are
combined with consciousness, perception arises. Since every appearance carries a
manifold and since various perceptions occur in our minds as separately, they are not
demanded to be gathered in one. Therefore, in us exists a faculty for synthesizing this
manifold. This faculty is called imagination by Kant. When immediately directed
upon perceptions it is called apprehension (CPR A120). This apprehension is not
able to produce an image or to connect the impressions. These are accomplished by
the reproductive faculty of imagination which forms the whole series of perceptions
and it is in an empirical character. However, this whole should conform to a rule in
order to give rise to the knowledge. This is supplied by the association of
representations (CPR A121). As for the productive imagination we know that since
the imagination is a faculty of a priori synthesis, it is productive. In both cases the
synthesis of imagination has its power to connect the manifold only as it appears.
Kant also mentions about the transcendental function of imagination and a pure kind
of imagination. The former indicates the relation of the faculty of the sensibility and
the understanding; those which are defined by Kant as the two extremes. The
transcendental function of the imagination enables subject to turn appearances into
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knowledge by connecting the two. We see this function in recognition, reproduction,
association and apprehension (CPR A125). Without this transcendental function of
the imagination a unitary experience made up of concepts of objects would not be
possible. Imagination by the transcendental synthesis also conditions the very
possibility of all experience, since any experience requires the reproduction of
appearances (CPR A101). As for the pure imagination Kant writes that it is the
condition of all a priori knowledge, thus a fundamental faculty of human soul. This
is because a pure apperception (the unchanging and enduring ‘I’) is immediately
added to it in order to relate all the representations so as to be conscious of them
(CPR A123).
In CJ, imagination occurs as the faculty which is responsible of the representation of
the object beautiful, by referring to the subject and its feeling of pleasure and
displeasure (CJ 203). We are also introduced with imagination’s the free conformity
to law of imagination in the third critique. Kant writes that if we think imagination as
free in judgement of taste, then this means that it is not reproductive but productive
and originates "arbitrary forms of possible intuitions" (CJ 240). It is not compelled to
conform to a law but "it is only a conformity to law without a law and a subjective
harmonizing of the imagination and understanding without an objective" (CJ 241).
Here the law mentioned is the law of understanding and we are warned that
imagination is not absolutely free or is not left to itself.23
Up to the section of genius, imagination is given as the faculty of recalling various
representations as the faculty of intuition and connection of the manifold of intuitions
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(CJ 143), thus its functions do not exceed the ones given in the CPR. Although in the
latter case its freedom is mentioned as consisting in its operating without a concept.
In this case imagination in its freedom accords with the latter in its conformity to
law. However, as one of the faculties consisting of the genius it is defined as a
productive faculty of cognition and as so being a powerful agent for creating a
second nature by means of the given by actual nature (CJ 314). It is claimed to
remodel experience by means of both laws based on analogy and the principle that
have their seat in reason. This function of the imagination is responsible of our
feeling freedom from the law of association that belongs to the empirical
employment of the imagination. Thus, we get our material from nature in accordance
with this law but we make it into something else that exceeds nature (CJ 314).24
Kant names ideas the representations resulted from this function of imagination. He
gives the reason for giving this name as their attempt to reach something beyond the
refinements of experience and thus their looking for approaching to a presentation of
rational concepts or intellectual ideas in order to attain a similar kind of objective
reality for these concepts (CJ 314). These objective realities implied to give a body to
those aesthetic ideas in order for them to claim existence in reciprocal relation of the
subject to the other subjects.
Since the issue of the experience of the beautiful is sensation, we deal with the
empirical side of imagination that serves for sensibility in order to have the raw data
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 Addingly, this consisting with the free conformity to law of the understanding is called finality apart
from end.
24
 This empirical employment of imagination implies the faculty of intuition and connection of the
manifold of intuitions (CJ 143). Here we have two senses of freedom. The last one seems for freer
than the one mentioned above.
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as a manifold or as associated appearances. Its second function is transcendental and
it enables the subject to turn these associated appearances taken from sensibility into
Knowledge. Thus, it serves for the faculty of understanding. However, Kant does not
seem to imply these two functions of imagination, which occur in CJ. He mentions
imagination only as the faculty of a priori intuitions (CJ 190). In this case it seems
that we are not concerned with empirical function, or with transcendental function,
since the pleasure that arises is independent of any concept. However, the question is
how and which intuitions a priori imagination can relate to the form of the object.
Now we have the two faculties in reflective judgement one of which is the faculty of
concepts while the other is the faculty of intuitions a priori. When we reflect merely
on the form of the object, a free play takes place between the two, and as a result, a
feeling of pleasure arises.
(1) The form (of an object) is what is passed from a priori intuitions; space and time,
(2) In reflective judgement imagination reflects upon the form,
(3) And it is accorded with understanding.
In my opinion the form is subjected to the recalled registers of imagination by its free
act. Since these registers are not free of understanding as knowledge of objects as
belonging to the past experiences, then accordance can be explained as the
imagination’s free play not with understanding but with past registers that had been
given by understanding, since imagination has a power to recall regardless of the
time passed (CJ 234). This can also be proved by the very fact that understanding is
determinant and is not given in CPR as even slightly free. Now if this view was
acceptable then the question that would arise is whether the CJ can still be regarded
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as a bridge. The answer would be positive, I think. It is because Kant did not need to
place understanding as the side of a notion of free play in order to combine two
distinct faculties of human cognition, namely understanding and reason. Kant could
give a sign of the power of imagination to create new representations among the ones
given by understanding and registered in memory. By means of such a claim
imagination would still be dependent on understanding as Kant claimed and its being
a “powerful agent for creating” or its producing a “second nature” would be
confirmed in the CPR. Thus, most critics would not regard its “remodelling
experience following the principles seated in reason” as ad hoc. However, Kant does
not accept that the pleasure is related to the “mere apprehension (apprehensio) of the
form of an object in intuition, apart from any reference it may have to a concept for
the purpose of a definite cognition" (CJ 189). It is because Kant claims that if it is so
then the representation refers to subject and not to the object and it is this which
makes it difficult to give an account of subjective validity.
According to the section 31 of the Critique of Judgement we see that imagination can
behave independently of the understanding’s concepts and this latter function of it
belongs to the realm of reason which like imagination looks beyond the experience.
Indeed it is not surprising to confront with imagination in the land of reason, since
with its ideas Reason should somehow uses imagination simply in establishing the
ideas such as the world which is a totality but not a single intuitive object. In the case
of the aesthetic ideas, Kant claims that they lack bodies, thus, the objective reality is
sought by ideas to give existence to these aesthetic ideas. This attempt to give
existence to the aesthetic ideas refers to the understanding (as one of the sides of the
free play which culminates in a feeling of pleasure and finally in the aesthetic
67
judgement) in the sense that the notion of existence needs a support of cognition in
order to have an objective reality, if this is acceptable then the position of
understanding as one side of the free play is affirmed: Kant wrote the third critique in
order to link the two distinct realms, namely the understanding and the reason.
3. 6. On Sublime
In this section I want to examine the mode of the subject in the moment of the
sublime. From the side of the imagination sublime moment can be defined as a
shortcut caused by being overloaded. In this moment imagination is so compelled to
go beyond the bounds of the sensibility in order for itself to present the infinity that it
is paralyzed. The subject is helpless and overwhelmed by nature, thus feels a
negative pleasure. Kant defines this pleasure as "sterner stuff, more like respect, and
deserves the name of “negative” pleasure (CJ 265). This respect seems as a result of
the feeling of being overwhelmed by nature, since the subject goes through a fearful
experience. This feeling is caused by some greatness compared to which everything
else is small. The faculty of imagination finds itself inadequate to represent the
magnitude or might of this greatness since it fails to measure it by the help of any
past registers or representations. It is crucial to differentiate this moment (of the
sublime) from an ordinary confusion of this cognitive faculty. In this case
imagination is compelled by reason to present the idea of infinity which is evoked by
a piece of nature. Thus, by including reason into the sublime moment, Kant places
the sublime to a higher position than a simple cognition of the mind. In this moment
reason interferes with the employment of imagination. Kant writes:
The proper mental mood for a feeling of the sublime
postulates the mind’s susceptibility for ideas, since it is
precisely in the failure of nature to attain to these-and
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consequently only under presupposition of this
susceptibility and of the straining of the imagination to use
the nature as a schema for ideas-that there is something
forbidding to sensibility, but which, for all that, has an
attraction for us, arising from the fact of its being a
dominion which reason exercises over sensibility with a
view to extending it to the requirements of its own realm
(the practical) and letting it look out beyond itself into the
infinite, which for it is an abyss (CJ 115).
Thus, the aesthetic judgement upon the sublime refers to the exercise of imagination
as a means of reason. Now the best thing is to analyse the moment of the sublime in
detail, since it promises more than a notion of a simple confusion.
To begin with, the feeling of the sublime is evoked by a piece of nature which cannot
be represented in a proper sense because of its magnitude. This causes a shortcut in
the faculty of imagination which is responsible from its representation. However, the
question is: What kind of an object is not representable in Kantian system? Kant
would answer by claiming that there cannot be such an object which is an object of
an empirical experience and cannot be represented. Kant would claim this because
the possibility of such a case would mean not having a phenomenon or an
appearance of the thing that appears which is out of question for Kant. However, in
the sublime moment we face such an object which evokes the idea of infinity with its
magnitude or might by breaking the bound of the sensibility. In this case the bound
of sensibility is transcended by imagination’s failure to cognize the bounds of the
object in order to represent it as a totality or in other words in order to make it a
proper phenomenon. Kant writes that:
[I]magination can never reach beyond the sensible
world but still this thrusting aside of the sensible
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barriers gives it a feeling of being unbounded; and that
removal is thus a presentation of the infinite (CJ 127).
Thus, reason interferes with the retarded cognition and compels imagination to have
an idea of the infinity which according to Kant can be thought without contradiction.
Parallel to the idea of infinity the sublime provokes a representation of limitlessness
(CJ 91). Thus, the sublime, as stated in above sections, does not depend on a
sensuous form. This implies that it is not a cognitive experience nor an aesthetic
estimate. The reason is that in the case of an aesthetic estimate for instance in the
experience of the beautiful, we know that there is a free play between the faculties of
the imagination and the understanding upon the form of an object. This free play
culminates in an aesthetic judgement which announces that the object as beautiful.
However, in the case of the sublime when the object is announced to be the sublime,
what is meant is its evoking the feeling of the sublime in the subject. In other words,
we name objects as beautiful in its full meaning, since we relate at least to their form,
but this is not the case with the sublime. Obviously, Kant is not against calling an
object as sublime but this seems for the sake of nothing but convenience.
In the case of the beautiful as a result of an aesthetic
estimate we have a presentation of an indeterminate concept
of the understanding whereas in the sublime we have that of
an indeterminate conclusion of reason (CJ 91).
In its being a conclusion of the faculty of reason which looks for the representation
of totality, the sublime seems to be more than an aesthetic estimate. Moreover, we
know that in the moment of the sublime imagination fails in the aesthetic estimation
of the magnitude. The implications of this claim will be discussed later. For now I
want to examine the claim which suggests that the sublime object is a thing in itself
or a nature in itself. This claim is refused by Kant, however he writes:
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[t]he objects called sublime trigger a power of resistance
which supply us courage to compare ourselves by the
omnipotence of nature (CJ 124),
This makes the above claim reasonable. First of all, it seems that Kant differentiates
nature from the subject which is usually not the case within Kantian system, since
nature is represented as a totality of the physical laws. This means that it is an idea
but not a thing- in-itself to which an intuition corresponds, thus it is a product of our
cognitive faculty but not a determined external intuition. Then what does it mean to
have omnipotence for nature, since it is an idea? In this sense the nature in the
sublime moment seems to be regarded as thing-in-itself even if this claim is refuted
by Kant by reminding the fact that imagination cannot lay hold of that which is
beyond the sensible world   (CJ 127).   However, we should notice that in the
sublime moment imagination fails in the aesthetic estimate of the magnitude of the
object appearing, so the subject is regarded to face a thing that cannot be represented
in either a cognitive or an aesthetic representation. Kant attributes this kind of an
experience to a supersensible faculty the employment of  which is triggered by the
idea of infinity the representation of which cannot be achieved by imagination. What
I tried to do by analysing this claim is to go over the fundamental possibility upon
the object called sublime. Although I do not agree with the claim that the object of
the sublime is a thing-in-itself, still thinking that Kant fails to clear this point. His
subject’s resisting  to that object or the interference of reason25 leads one to think that
the object confronted is a thing-in-itself.
                                                          
25
 When its direct relation to the things-in-themselves in free will is considered, reason’s  interference
as compelling imagination for representing the greatness in the experience of sublime, leads to the
claim above.
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I do not think that the object or the piece of nature in the sublime moment is a thing-
in-itself. Moreover, I do not think that this object has dominion over us since it is
able to evoke the feeling of the sublime. It is because in the case of an ocean which is
called sublime, we sure know that it is finite (otherwise it would be a total delusion),
thus its magnitude reminds us the idea of infinity. However, we are also aware that
we have boundaries for sensibility since our cognitive faculties have their own limits.
This is clearly stated by Kant when he talks about the hierarchy between the three
major faculties, respectively sensibility, understanding and reason. Thus, as the
conclusion of this section I claim that what makes the moment of sublime crucial is
not the greatness we face or the feeling of being overwhelmed.
Relying on this conclusion I want to analyse the negative pleasure felt in the moment
of the sublime. Kant writes that the feeling of sublime is something more like respect
but it is also fearful and stirring. This feeling is caused by the conflict between the
faculty of imagination and reason about the representation of the idea of infinity. Its
being negative may be interpreted as referring to the failure of the imagination,
however, the pleasure seems to be thrilled by the magnitude or the might of the piece
of nature confronted. This notion of negative pleasure indicates that the experience of
sublime is in no way peaceful. I suggest that this negative pleasure is a break point in
the experience of sublime. It indicates a pleasure coupled with a feeling of failure, or
that of being transcended. However, in my opinion Kant would accept that this
negative pleasure is such a feeling that it suggests somehow an addiction26.
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 The addictive character comes from empowering of the subject in the moment of sublime when he
is able to grasp that he is in safe and can handle this greatness.
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With respect to the conflict between the imagination and reason, again one should be
reminded that it does not follow from a failure of imagination in its responsibilities
but from the nature of imagination which cannot ‘lay hold beyond the sensible
world’ (CJ 124). When the magnitude of an object transcends the capability of
imagination, reason compels it to go further while imagination announces its
incapability of representing an idea of infinity since it is impossible to reach an
intuition of a totality. This notion of conflict and failure of imagination can be
interpreted as a corruption or collapse of the subject. In other words, it cannot be
regarded as the moment in which subject discovers a greatness over which no subject
can rule, and may be shaking. The subject confronts something whose sensible
representation is possible and whose ideal representation cannot be handled. This
kind of experience is clearly of a soul-stirring kind. However, interpreting this
moment as destructive in the sense of discovering the impossibility of being a subject
does not seem to be the only possibility.
We know that Kant grounds the moment of sublime on failure of the imagination
which is successful in the experience of the beautiful in accordance with the
understanding. In the latter case imagination is one of the sides of a free play and has
its freedom to confirm to a law without a law. However, in the case of sublime
imagination seems to be deprived of all its power and freedom, since it fails to
represent and it is paralyzed in front of the greatness or the power of a piece of
nature. Thus, in the case of sublime the subject feels himself beaten by the greatness
of nature. Not surprisingly, in such a case the Kantian subject feels disappointed by
living through a moment of inability. It seems that the imagination strives towards ad
infinitum but is never able to grasp the absolute totality the reason is looking for. In
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such a moment imagination is compelled to go beyond the service of sensibility, but
all it is faced with is the limitation of sensibility and a feeling of inadequacy. Kant
writes that:
The feeling of unattainability of the idea by means of
imagination, is itself a presentation of the subjective finality
of our mind in the employment of the imagination in the
interests of the mind’s supersensible province, and compels
us subjectively to think nature itself in its totality as a
presentation of something supersensible, without being able
to effectuate this presentation objectively
(CJ 119).
According to the paragraph above we have a supersensible faculty whose existence
has been celebrated in other sections of the sublime. For instance, Kant writes that:
The sublime consists merely in the relation exhibited by the
estimate of the serviceability of the sensible in the
representation of nature for a possible supersensible
employment (CJ 118).
This faculty enables us to think nature-in-itself, not in an objective but subjective
manner, as a totality. In other words, nature in its totality can only be presented as
supersensible. The question that arises immediately is why Kant does not define
nature as an idea of reason but as supersensible. All of the ideas of reason are
actually supersensible or transcendental like world or God. It is quite obvious that
Kant differentiates the moment of the sublime even from the employment of reason
or its ideas. He equates the feeling of failure with the presentation of the subjective
finality of our mind. When the subjective finality is at work, a feeling of intention in
failure should be considered seriously.
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Therefore, I suggest that we make the first reading a double reading of the sublime.
The first reading admits the view that the sublime moment is a fatal stroke for the
subject. The failure or inadequacy of imagination is shaking for Kantian subject who
is a producer and the governor of his own world as that of appearances. However I
also suggest a second reading: This moment of inadequacy leads to the moment of
awareness in which the subject is able to face his capability. This moment is sharply
different than knowing the faculties of mind or their functions. This moment presents
an internal look into the subjectivity, which is not conditional, of the subject. The
look mentioned is not an intellectual vision which enables one to go beyond himself
or take an external reference point to vision all whatsoever. It is neither to present the
cognitive faculties as a totality like in the case of ideas of reason. It is a moment of
the subject’s looking itself, its discovering the condition of the possibility of
existence of the faculties of the mind. It is facing the pure or the transcendental
condition of all possible experience. If one insists on defining this occurrence as an
experience, then it should be known that no content could be suggested for such an
experience. In it there cannot be any subject or object as distinctive. This moment is
a moment of ceasing to be a subject in the proper sense, since the subject sees no use
of the cognitive faculties which produces appearances or phenomena. This is the
moment in which the bounds of sensibility are broken by the failure of imagination
in presenting the idea of infinity. It is sure that the idea of infinity cannot be fully
responsible for this soul-stirring moment. The subject of Kantian system should have
met the delusions or inability of the faculties of both sensibility and imagination.
Thus, the failure of imagination can be expected to be shocking but not to have a
fatal effect for the subject. Besides, the unavoidable tendency of Kantian subject
which is looking beyond the sensibility, implied from the very beginning the
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impossibility of this opportunity. Thus, even the notion of the supersensible faculty
as the subjective finality of the subject is nothing new and does not correspond to the
unique experience of the sublime27.
Now I suggest that the moment of sublime should have carried further by Kant who
definitely seemed to have felt the significance of the moment of the sublime but at
the same time did not want to place the sublime outside of the Critique of Judgement.
The second reading I mentioned above sees the moment of the sublime and the
inadequacy grounding it as an opportunity to face the condition of all possible
experience. Now we know that this condition of all possible experience corresponds
to the transcendental I in the Kantian philosophy. Claiming that the moment of the
sublime supplies the subject confronting this condition, namely the transcendental I,
is not a result of being strictly attached to Kantian discourse. However, I believe that
Kantian sublime is much more than being simply an aesthetic estimate. Now I
suggest that the moment of the sublime might not be merely the moment in which the
subject is collapsed or faced the fact of impossibility of constructing himself as a
subject. The feeling of being overwhelmed by something external and ungraspable
does not necessarily make the subject fall apart. The feeling of inadequacy involves a
moment of failure but this moment of failure is at the same time the fundamental
condition of experiencing the condition of all experience which is the subject’s being
a subject. In Kantian philosophy the transcendental condition of all possible
experience is named the transcendental I. Now my view about the moment of
sublime and its implications can be regarded as suggesting that the transcendental I
as this condition. I am not in an attempt of doing so for the sake of being attached to
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 In the moment of sublime the moral subject seems to be at work. However, I suggest that it is the
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Kantian philosophy, however such an interpretation seems arguable. I claim that the
inadequacy which evokes the feeling of the sublime is the keystone of facing the
primary condition of human experience. In the moment of the sublime the bounds of
sensibility is beaten, then the subject faces this primary condition. We know that the
faculty of cognition are out of work in this moment, so when I talk about a condition
and its being experienced in the moment of sublime, it is obvious that by this
condition nothing like space or time is meant. In the case of space and time one can
argue about their subjective or objective existence, however, the condition suggested
here is also the conditions of space and time. Therefore, it can be called as the
original principle or the condition when compared to all the other conditions
whatsoever. Then in this sense the notion of the transcendental I seems to entail this
sense of being the original principle of all experience.
 In the moment of the sublime the failure of getting a phenomenon from the
experience of the object that evokes the feeling of the sublime may be read as
subject’s facing his own excess, his own border-without externalizing himself. In this
moment the experience does not have a proper object, since the subject does not
externalize himself. Thus, facing his own subjectivity (in the condition of all
possibility) does not mean to view or experience all cognitive faculties and all
elements whatsoever in a totality. The content of the experience (in the sublime
moment) cannot be defined but only addressed.
Therefore, what I suggest as the “experiencing” the “transcendental I” as the
condition of all subjectivity does not claim any empirical content for the moment
                                                                                                                                                                    
transcendental self  not the moral subject.
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questioned. Moreover, this “experience” is not an ordinary kind. In other words this
“experience” is not a cognitive or an aesthetic kind. This moment is the moment of
revelation of the fundamental condition of all possible experience. Therefore, the
name transcendental I is nothing but a convenience. It does not refer to an entity or a
concept. It stands for an assumption resulted from the structure of the Kantian system
which separates the subject from object and postulates the subject as the constructor
of its own object as the object of experience.
Now, it seems that what is claimed for the moment of the sublime in the above
section is a kind of experience which does not address an object or which does not
have a content. This nature of the sublime suggests a glance of the self into himself.
This look is of an internal kind. The subject passes through his own possibility to
become a subject. This moment can be grasped by neither cognition nor aesthetic
estimation in reflection. Both of these modes of thinking have their own object to act
upon. However, in the moment of falling into his own subjective grounds, the subject
does not have his object as the object of this moment. This moment is a moment in
which the subject is deprived of all means of the mind.
At this point one may ask how such a moment is not destructive since the subject is
well aware that the faculties are not able to operate or that they fail to conceive or
estimate the sublime object. However, what I suggest is not a replacement of this
idea with the notion of a renewal of the subject. On the contrary, I believe that this
failure which disappoints the subject is the condition of subject’s facing his own
subjectivity. Since the failure occurred in the aesthetic estimate of the magnitude of
the sublime object, it seems that this special kind of failure, which should be
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distinguished from any kind of ordinary confusion of the mind, is the condition of
facing the core of the subjectivity in Kant. However, when this moment is read as
facing the transcendental I as a condition, one should be aware of the problem that
arises. In such a case we would have been understood to claim the existence of a
condition of all conditions that is the transcendental I. For the sake of the moment it
may be useful to keep this possibility in mind.
Back to the moment of awareness of himself as the producer of his world. This is a
feeling like being a stranger in one’s own territory. Therefore, this moment produces
a  negative pleasure. However, this is at the same time the moment of the awareness
of power and the capacity of being the governor of the whole world of the subject.
The subject passes through this possibility which he is always aware as a fact. Living
through this fact is much more thrilling than any kind of experience. Thus, the
subject is smashed by this capacity to rule. When the subject externalizes that
moment the omnipotence of the subject has been celebrated, since he becomes
conscious that up to that unique moment he was the center and the constructor of the
world of appearances which is actually the only world for him. Thus, even in the
moment of sublime the subject does not go beyond the bounds of sensibility but
extends its consciousness to the very limits.
Now such a moment cannot be caused simply and absolutely by a piece of nature.
What leads the subject to his own limit is not a thing-in-itself or a piece of nature but
the effect of an appearance which challenges the measures of imagination, since Kant
carefully warns us that the sublime is not in the object but in our mind (CJ 114).
79
The last part of my claim suggests that this moment of facing the very condition of
the subject is an opportunity that implies an intention of the subject. It is a moment of
pain coupled and ended with the satisfaction of the subject by confirming once again
that he is the god of his world. It is an ironic mood of the subject in which he greets
the thing that appears with fear and with Kant’s words when we feel safe, then we
resist to the omnipotence of nature. The intention mentioned above may be seen as
the wish of the reason, which always has the tendency of going beyond all the
experience.
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4. CONCLUSION
As my last words I would like to make an overview of the issues that I deal in the CJ.
What causes the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is not the matter or content of the
object but the form of the object.
Necdet Bozkurt writes that the aesthetic idea is not one of ideas of reason such as
“god”, “spirit”, “world” or “necessity” because it cannot be expressed as such by the
language. It is not a concept of reason but the representation of imagination. It
resembles the ideas of reason in the sense that they both have an intention or a
tendency for totality which means that they both intend to go beyond the experience.
Ideas of Aesthetic do not have concepts which express them as such, just like ideas
of reason do not have a sensation or intuition that would correspond to them (Sanat
ve Estetik Kuramlar127).
Bozkurt continues by stating that from a critical point of view Kant’s method in
Critique of Judgement which depends upon a priori givens, does not satisfy those
who want their aesthetics to be more psychological and more empirical, since it
remains quite transcendental (CJ 130).
This critique indicates a neglected possibility of subjective universality because the
subjective universality of an aesthetic judgement is opposed by most of the critics
such as Charlie Broad and Paul Crowther since the question of the variety of tastes is
asked by this above mentioned followers. Kantian aesthetics should be sought for the
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pure possibility of subjective universality. This means that Kant’s difficulty is not
claiming a subjective universality for aesthetic judgements and failing to explain it.
This difficulty arouse when one demanded him to theorize the free play which takes
place between imagination and understanding. Kant’s failure seems not to emphasize
or analyze the ideas of imagination which will enable him to explain the possibility
of diversity of subjects having the same structure of mind. He should have
differentiated between sensation and understanding or perceiving and conceiving in
order to construct a theory of aesthetics. According to Kant, the subjective means
belonging to the subject who shares the same structure with all human kind.
Moreover, something subjective can be at the same time universal in Kantian system
when it depends upon the sensation such as the experience of beautiful in which we
have a relation of a pre-conceptual kind with the form of the object. This means that
in the Kantian sense of the word we have no problem with subjective universality.
The problem arising is that Kantian system tries to explain or theorize or
conceptualize even the land of freedom to the extent that it is let by language. Thus,
up to the third critique, we seem to have a smooth theory but in the Critique of
Judgement, we confront with a notion of free play which takes place between
understanding and imagination. Most of the critics claim that Kant cannot give an
explanation for this free play. It is obvious that no ultimate reason or rule can be
given in order to explain the variety of tastes. Even Kant knew that, thus the notion
of free play is not an ad hoc explanation. This criticism implies that Kant up to the
Critique of Judgement did not realize that we do not have the same delight or taste. It
does not seem reasonable. However, it seems that Kant fails to open a space for
subject, since he writes very little, most of which remain too transcendental, on the
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notion of the subject. It seems that we do not have a ground- for the endless
possibilities of tastes- as subject, even though Kant writes on the reflective character
of reason. It is because Kant does not push our knowledge of subject to its limit like
he does for any other notion such as things-in themselves or ideas of reason. In my
opinion Kantian system has a space for the aesthetics in the sense that it has ideas of
reason and ideas of imagination both of which tend to go beyond the given
experience. With the notion of reflective judgement and the addition of a theory of
memory Kantian subject would be able to give the account for the diversity of taste.
With respect to the sublime, I think Kant should have focused on its implications in
the subject. We know that Kant relates aesthetic judgement to understanding whereas
for sublime he announces a supersensible faculty which is in charge of the
representation of the idea of infinity. It is noteworthy that this supersensible faculty
is not the reason itself. The feeling of this faculty evoked by the idea of infinity, in
the representation of which imagination fails. The celebration of this supersensible
faculty seems insufficient for its legitimization since Kant does not write much about
it.
Another important point is actually indicated by Paul Crowther who writes:
...Kant links sublimity and morality rather too closely. In
effect, he reduces the sublime to a kind of indirect moral
experience (Kantian Sublime 166).
Kant gives this relation of moral ideas to the sublime in the modality of sublime and
claims that the sublime is terrifying for the man whose moral ideas are not
developed. He continues by stating that only the man who has no feeling can be
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regardless of the sublime (CJ 265). Also Francis Coleman is another scholar who
writes that the finality of the sublime is grounded in our being aware of the fact that
we belong to the world of moral ends (CJ 106).
For me, the application to the morality should be read as addressing Kant’s wish to
imply the deep relation of the moment of the sublime and the moral subject. I believe
that by attributing a great importance to the development of the moral ideas in the
moment of the sublime Kant tried to imply this non-verbal relation.28 I claimed that
the subjectivity which is faced in the moment of sublime is the transcendental self as
the original condition of all subjectivity in Kant. He seems to give the subject of the
sublime as the moral subject and claims the moment of sublime as the final end of
the subject’s being a moral subject. However, I tried to justify that the sublime,
which arises from the conflict of imagination and reason, leads subject to face his
original subjectivity. I also claimed that unlike the beautiful the subjective
universality of sublime does not depend on sensus communis. The moment is
subjective in the sense of being personal and it is universal since it leads one to face
the original condition of all subjectivity (transcendental I) which is necessarily
universal. Thus, I claim that the universality of the sublime moment does not come
from its relation to the moral character of the subject as having his moral destination
but its leading to face this original condition in question.
I am well aware the fact one can read my claim as I announce the subject of the
moment of sublime as the transcendental subject instead of the moral subject.
However, this would be wrong since I do not claim that the moment of the sublime is
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the moment of one’s experiencing the transcendental I. The usage of the word
“experience” should not be taken in its ordinary meaning in Kantian philosophy. In
other words, the experience in question does not indicate a cognitive event. I used
that word as a convenience. Thus, anyone interested in this study should be aware of
the fact that the transcendental I of Kant is not a subject in proper sense but a
condition. Now I cannot be suggesting an experience of a condition. What I argue for
the moment of the sublime is the awareness of the subject’s pure29 possibility of
being a subject. I think facing the original condition of all the possible experience
cannot be represented in a cognitive or even in an aesthetic way. This “experience”
does not have a content to be represented. It cannot be indicated or universally
postulated but it can merely be addressed. Thus, the universal character of the
moment of sublime comes from the very principal of being a subject.
                                                                                                                                                                    
28
 Actually I do not know whether Kant was aware of the implications of the sublime but the close
connection to the moral ideas seems to provide the ground that I need for my own claim.
29
 It is pure because an empirical possibility of being a subject would mean to be an empirical self.
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